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benefit,  or  causing  a  loss,  by  deception  or  other means.’1  Fraud  against  the 
Commonwealth  can  be  broadly  categorised  as  being  either  external  (fraud 
committed  by  clients  or  customers,  service  providers  and  members  of  the 
public) or  internal  (fraud committed by employees and contractors).  In some 
cases,  fraud  against  the  Commonwealth  may  involve  collusion  between 
external  and  internal  parties,  which  may  not  only  result  in  loss  for  the 
Commonwealth,  but may  also  involve  corrupt  conduct  such  as  bribery  and 
secret commissions.  





3. Fraud  threats are ongoing and  can affect any Australian Government 
entity.  In  2010–11,  external  and  internal  fraud  losses  against  the 
Commonwealth were  estimated at $119 million.2 Approximately  $116 million 
of  these  estimated  losses  related  to  external  fraud,  while  some  $3 million 
related to internal fraud.  
The Australian Government’s fraud control framework 
4. Australian Government  entities  have  long  been  required  to  establish 
arrangements  to  manage  the  risks  of  fraud.  The  Financial Management  and 
Accountability  Act  1997  (FMA  Act),  which  operated  during  the  course  of 
                                                     
1  The definition incorporates ‘a mental or fault element to fraud; it requires more than carelessness, 
accident or error.’ See Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines 
2011, March 2011, AGD, Canberra, p. 5.  
2  The ANAO was provided with unpublished data from the 2010–11 survey of Australian Government 
entities conducted by the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) for the annual report on ‘Fraud 
Against the Commonwealth’. The most recent published report was Fraud Against the Commonwealth 
in 2009–10.   
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fieldwork  for  this audit3, placed a number of  ‘special  responsibilities’ on  the 
Chief Executives of FMA Act agencies. For example, section 44 of the FMA Act 
required  Chief  Executives  to  promote  the  proper  use  of  Commonwealth 
resources,  while  section  45  required  the  implementation  of  a  fraud  control 
plan. In addition, section 64 and FMA Regulation 16A made provision for the 
responsible minister4 to issue Fraud Control Guidelines.5,6 
The Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines 
5. At  the  time  of  the  audit  fieldwork,  the  Australian  Government’s 
framework  for  fraud  control  was  set  out  in  the  2011  Commonwealth  Fraud 
Control  Guidelines  (the  Guidelines).  The  Guidelines  established  the  fraud 
control  policy  framework within which  entities were  expected  to  determine 
their own  specific practices, plans and procedures  to manage  the prevention 
and detection of fraudulent activities.  
6. The  Guidelines  contained  a  mix  of  mandatory  fraud  control 
requirements  and  other  recommended  practices  as  a  basis  for  sound  fraud 





 implementation of a program of general  fraud awareness  training  for 
employees  and  contractors,  and  more  specialised  training  for  those 
people engaged in fraud control activities;  
                                                     
3  The FMA Act and Regulations established the Australian Government resource framework in place 
during fieldwork for this audit. The FMA Act and the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 
1997 (CAC Act) were replaced by the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 
(PGPA Act) and associated Rules which took effect from 1 July 2014. 
4  In practice, the Minister for Justice.  
5  The Guidelines were part of the Australian Government’s wider financial management framework and 
were issued under FMA Regulation 16A until 30 June 2014.  
6  Regulation 16A also provided that an official performing duties in relation to the control and reporting 
of fraud must act in accordance with the Guidelines. Section 13 of the Public Service Act 1999, which 
sets out the APS Code of Conduct, similarly emphasises the need for all officials to protect public 
resources.  
7  The Guidelines observed at paragraph 5.1 that effective fraud control requires the commitment of all 
employees, contractors and third party providers, with the primary responsibility resting with CEOs, 
who play a key role in ensuring that appropriate fraud control arrangements are in place, and in setting 
the ethical tone within the entity.  
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focused  on  embedding  fraud  control  and  prevention  as  part  of  an  entity’s 
culture and governance arrangements8; a senior leadership responsibility. The 
ANAO’s 2011 Better Practice Guide on Fraud Control  in Australian Government 
Entities  (the  Fraud  Control  BPG)  described  this  as  a  ‘contemporary’ 
management  approach  to  fraud  control9,  in  contrast  to  the more  traditional 
approach focusing primarily on compliance with requirements, detection and 
investigation.10  The  Fraud  Control  BPG  observed  that  sound  and  effective 
fraud control requires commitment at all organisational levels within an entity. 
Just  as  governance  and  project  management  arrangements  have  evolved  to 
become common practice in government entities, fraud control strategies need 
to mature and become an accepted part of the day‐to‐day running of entities.11  
8. All  FMA  Act  agencies  were  subject  to  the  requirements  of  the  2011 
Guidelines.  In addition, a number of Commonwealth Authorities and Companies 
Act  1997  (CAC  Act)  entities,  including  Comcare12,  chose  to  apply  the 
Guidelines as a matter of good practice.13,14 
                                                     
8  In his foreword to the 2011 Guidelines, the Minister for Justice observed that ‘at the heart of the new 
Guidelines is an obligation on agency CEOs to build a strong fraud prevention culture within their 
agencies.’ The Guidelines further emphasised that ‘Fraud control strategies should become an integral 
part of agency culture, processes and practices’ (paragraph 3.3) and that ‘Fraud prevention involves 
not only putting into place effective accounting and operational controls, but also fostering an ethical 
culture that encourages employees and contractors at all levels to play their part in protecting public 
resources’ (paragraph 8.1).  
9  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra, p.1.  
10  Fraud prevention strategies are the first line of defence and provide the most cost-effective method of 
controlling fraud within an entity. However, they cannot realistically be expected to eliminate the risk of 
fraud. The 2011 Guidelines observed that the threat of fraud is becoming more complex, with the trend 
toward online service delivery and digital record keeping, for example, creating opportunities for 
cybercriminals operating domestically and overseas. Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth 
Fraud Control Guidelines 2011, March 2011, AGD, Canberra, Foreword.   
11  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra, Foreword.  
12  Comcare is one of the entities included in this audit.  
13  Entities subject to the CAC Act were only required to apply the Guidelines where the Finance Minister 
had made a General Policy Order pursuant to Section 48A of the CAC Act that specified the applicable 
requirements. The Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) advised the ANAO that no such policy 
orders were made by the Finance Minister.   
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9. The  fraud  control  policy  framework  and  2011  Guidelines  were 
administered by  the Attorney‐General’s Department  (AGD), which provided 
advice  to agencies on  the Guidelines and had responsibility  for advising and 
reporting to ministers on whole‐of‐government fraud control arrangements.  
Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 
10. The  basis  of  the  fraud  control  framework  altered  from  1  July  2014, 
when the FMA Act and Regulations were replaced by a new Fraud Rule made 
pursuant  to  the  Public  Governance,  Performance  and  Accountability  Act  2013 
(PGPA  Act).15  The  2011  Guidelines  were  also  replaced  on  1  July  2014  by  a 
Guide16  issued  by  the  Minister  for  Justice  under  the  Fraud  Rule,  and  a 
Commonwealth  Fraud  Control  Policy.17  AGD  continues  to  administer  the 
fraud control framework.  
Selected entities in this audit 
11. The  entities  selected  for  this  audit  were:  the  Australian  Trade 
Commission  (Austrade);  Comcare;  and  the  Department  of  Veterans’  Affairs 
(DVA).  The  overall  administration  of  the  fraud  control  framework  by  the 
Attorney‐General’s Department was also examined as part of the audit.  
12. Further  contextual  information on  the  selected  entities  is provided  in 
Table S.1. 
                                                                                                                                             
14  ANAO Report No.42 2009–10 Fraud control in Australian Government Agencies, had recommended 
that the Attorney-General’s Department ‘… continue to work with the [then] Department of Finance 
and Deregulation to clarify which CAC Act bodies are subject to the Guidelines...’ AGD advised the 
ANAO that it had suspended this work in 2012, due to the advent of the PGPA Act.  
15  The Fraud Rule states that it is intended to establish a minimum standard for managing the risk and 
incidents of fraud. It provides that entities must take all reasonable measures to prevent, detect and 
deal with fraud relating to the entity, including by: conducting fraud risk assessments; developing and 
implementing a fraud control plan; and having an appropriate mechanism for preventing, detecting, 
investigating, recording and reporting fraud.  
16  The Guide indicates that it is ‘non-binding, but provides best practice to assist accountable authorities 
to meet their obligations under the fraud rule.’ Resource Management Guide No.201: Preventing, 
detecting and dealing with fraud, July 2014, p.5.  
17  The Policy contains procedural requirements which supplement the Fraud Rule. Section 21 of the 
PGPA Act requires that an entity be governed in a way that is not inconsistent with government 
policies.   
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Table S.1 Contextual information about the selected entities 
 Austrade Comcare Department of 
Veterans’ Affairs 






advice and services 
to business, the 
education sector 




To provide consular 
and passport 
services in specific 
locations overseas. 
To partner with 
workers, their 
employers and 
unions to keep 
workers healthy and 
safe, and reduce the 
incidence and cost of 




common law liabilities 
for asbestos 
compensation. 
To develop and 
implement programs 
that provide services 
and support to the 
veteran and defence 
force communities.  





Entity type during the 
course of the audit 
FMA Act CAC Act FMA Act 










 Fraudulent claims 







 Fraudulent claims 
by clients and 
service providers. 
 
Number of staff (as at 
June 2013) 
2 712 2058 
Number of staff 
dedicated to Fraud 
Control Areas (as at 
June 2013) 
8 6 16 
Appropriation in 
millions (for 2013–14) 
$318.9m $897.5mA $12 429m 
Geographic location Worldwide 
locations, major 
offices in Sydney 
and Canberra. 
Offices in most states 
and territories. 
Offices in every state, 
major offices in 
Canberra and 
Queensland. 
Source: ANAO summary from agencies’ Portfolio Budget Statements, Submissions to the AIC and 
Annual Reports.  
Notes: A:  Comcare was not directly appropriated due to its status as a CAC Act entity. Appropriations 
were made to the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, and 
subsequently paid to Comcare. 
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Audit objective, criteria and scope 
13. The audit objective was to examine the selected entities’ effectiveness in 
implementing  entity‐wide  fraud  control  arrangements,  including  compliance 
with  the  requirements of  the 2011 Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines  
(2011  Guidelines),  and  the  overall  administration  of  the  fraud  control 
framework by the Attorney‐General’s Department (AGD).  







‐ processes  to  monitor,  evaluate  and  report  on  fraud  control 
arrangements; and 
 AGD  effectively  administered  the  fraud  control  framework  and 
supported entities, as required by  the Guidelines,  following release of 
the 2011 Guidelines.   
15. In  addition  to  examining  AGD’s  overall  administration  of  the  fraud 
control framework, the ANAO examined the department’s implementation of 
the ANAO’s most  recent  performance  audit  on  fraud  control.18  Further,  the 
ANAO examined  the  relationship between AGD and  the Australian  Institute 
of Criminology  (AIC)19,  relating  to  the  production  of  two  annual  reports  to 
government: Fraud Against  the Commonwealth  (Fraud Report); and Compliance 
with the Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines (Compliance Report).  
16. The  audit  did  not  examine  the  selected  entities’  actions  following  a 
decision  to  investigate  possible  fraudulent  activities.  Nor  did  the  audit 
examine the role of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) or the Commonwealth 
                                                     
18  ANAO Report No.42 2009–10 Fraud control in Australian Government Agencies. 
19  The AIC is a separate entity within the Attorney-General’s portfolio. It was not designated as an 
audited entity for this report. 
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Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  in  investigating  allegations  of  fraud  and 
conducting prosecutions.20  
17. Separately, the ANAO is conducting a performance audit of Austrade’s 
Export  Management  Development  Grants  (EMDG)  program,  including  its 




18. In  conducting  this  audit,  the ANAO:  interviewed  relevant  officers  in 
each  of  the  selected  entities,  AGD  and  the  AIC;  examined  relevant 
documentation,  controls  and  systems;  and  examined  whether  entities  had 
regard to better practice as discussed in the ANAO’s 2011 Fraud Control BPG.  
Overall conclusion 
19. Fraud  control  is  an  ongoing  responsibility  for Australian Government 
entities, providing a safeguard against: financial and material  losses which can 
impact  on  the Government’s  ability  to deliver  services  and  achieve  its policy 
objectives; reputational damage to government and responsible entities; and loss 
of  confidence  in  Australian  Government  administration.  Government 
expectations relating to fraud control have been promulgated over many years 
in  successive  Fraud  Control  Guidelines  (the  Guidelines)  administered  by  the 
Attorney‐General’s Department (AGD). Since 2011, the Guidelines have focused 
on  embedding  fraud  control  as  part  of  an  entity’s  culture  and  governance 
arrangements;  an  approach  which  has  highlighted  the  importance  of  risk 
management, fraud prevention, awareness‐raising and shared responsibility by 
entity  staff  and  management.  This  contemporary  approach  to  fraud  control 
contrasts  with  the  more  traditional  approach  focusing  on  compliance  with 
requirements and the detection and investigation of fraud after it has occurred.  
20. Overall,  the  selected  entities—Comcare,  the  Australian  Trade 
Commission (Austrade) and the Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA)—were 
generally compliant with  the applicable mandatory  requirements of  the 2011 
                                                     
20  On 31 July 2014, the Minister for Justice announced the establishment of a Fraud and Anti-Corruption 
Centre located in AFP headquarters. The Centre is intended to bring together the Australian Taxation 
Office, Australian Securities and Investment Commission, Australian Crime Commission, Australian 
Customs and Border Protection Service, Department of Human Services, Department of Immigration 
and Border Protection, Department of Defence and Department of Foreign Affairs. The Centre’s aim is 
to assess, prioritise and respond to matters relating to serious fraud and corruption.   
  
ANAO Report No.3 2014–15 
Fraud Control Arrangements 
 
20 
Fraud Control Guidelines  (2011 Guidelines)  in effect during  the course of  the 
audit, and had implemented a range of strategies and fraud control measures 
relevant  to  their  specific  circumstances.  The  strategies  and  measures 
implemented  by  the  selected  entities  had  regard  to  the  key  focus  areas 
identified  in  the  2011  Guidelines:  risk  assessment;  the  preparation  of  fraud 
control plans;  fraud awareness and  training,  including  for  third party service 
providers;  and  detection,  investigation  and  response. However,  the  selected 
entities’  progress  in  transitioning  to  the more  contemporary  and  preventive 
approach  has  varied,  with  Comcare  establishing  an  internal  framework 
generally aligned with the 2011 Guidelines, while DVA and Austrade were at 
different stages of transition.  
21. AGD’s overall administration of  the  fraud control  framework has been 
generally  effective.  The  department  administers  a  well‐developed  framework 
comprising:  documented  policy  and  guidance;  clear  assignment  of  roles  and 
responsibilities  between  AGD  and  entities;  identified  points  of  co‐ordination; 
and  the  provision  of  support  to  entities  through  networking,  communication 




providing  annual  information  updates  for  inclusion  in  the  reports, while  the 
Australian  Government  and  its  entities  have  not  had  the  benefit  of  annual 
reporting  on  key  trends  and  developments.  AGD  should  establish  a  formal 
arrangement with the AIC to facilitate the timely preparation and submission of 
the  reports,  to  inform  ministers  of  the  extent  of  fraud  against  the 
Commonwealth and entities’ compliance with government requirements.  
22. The networking,  communication  and  training  activities  sponsored  by 
AGD and discussed above, were  intended  to support entities  in  transitioning 
to  a  more  contemporary  risk‐based  approach  to  fraud  control.  AGD 
established dedicated Govdex and Govspace websites  to assist  the whole‐of‐
government  Fraud  Control  Network  and  individual  entities,  and  hosted 
workshops  and  seminars  during  2011–13  to  provide  training  for  key  entity 
personnel and support the introduction of the 2011 Guidelines.  
                                                     
21  Specifically, Fraud Against the Commonwealth and Compliance with the Commonwealth Fraud 
Control Guidelines. The reports are prepared by AGD in cooperation with the Australian Institute of 
Criminology (AIC).  
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the  road  towards  adopting  a more  contemporary  approach  to  fraud  control. 
Comcare participated actively in AGD networks and events, including hosting 
and  chairing  some  events, while DVA  had  only  occasional  involvement. At 
least  since  2010,  Austrade  and  DVA  did  not  participate  in  AGD‐sponsored 
forums  and  the  Fraud Control Network. Austrade  advised  that  it  started  to 
access the Govdex website during the course of the audit. Given the change in 




24. The ANAO  has made  one  recommendation  aimed  at  supporting  the 
timely  preparation  of  whole‐of‐government  fraud  control  reports  to 
government by AGD and  the AIC. This audit has also highlighted  scope  for 
some  entities  to  focus  more  strongly  on  transitioning  to  the  more 
contemporary  approach  to  fraud  control.22  Entities  in  transition  can  derive 
particular  benefit  from  ongoing  engagement  with  wider  Commonwealth 
networks,  promoting  shared  responsibility  amongst  staff  and  management, 
and continued senior management attention to drive implementation.  
Key findings by chapter 
Whole-of-government arrangements for fraud control (Chapter 2) 
25. AGD’s  overall  administration  of  the  Australian  Government’s  fraud 
control framework has been generally effective. The department administers a 
well‐developed  whole‐of‐government  framework  for  fraud  control  which 
includes: documented policy and guidance which has been regularly updated; 
clear  assignment  of  the  respective  roles  and  responsibilities  of  AGD  and 
entities; and identified points of co‐ordination. The framework is supported by 
whole‐of‐government advisory arrangements  intended  to  inform government 
and  entities  of  key  developments,  and  formal  mechanisms  to  support  and 
maintain communication with entities on policy and other developments.  
                                                     
22  DVA commenced a significant restructure of its fraud control governance and operational 
arrangements in August 2013. Austrade advised the ANAO in October 2014 that its fraud control 
arrangements would be reviewed internally.  
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26. Key  communication  and  advisory  mechanisms  include  the 
Commonwealth Fraud Control Network and Fraud Liaison Forum, as well as 
online  channels  such  as  dedicated  fraud  control  Govdex  and  Govspace 
websites.  During  2011‐13,  AGD  conducted  training  workshops  for  key 
personnel  and  seminars  to  assist  entities  with  establishing  and  maintaining 
appropriate  fraud  control  arrangements;  an  approach  intended  to  support 
entities  in  transitioning  to  the more contemporary, risk‐based and preventive 
approach to fraud control promoted in the 2011 Guidelines.  
27. The 2011 Guidelines required AGD, in cooperation with the Australian 
Institute  of Criminology  (AIC),  to produce  two key  reports  annually—Fraud 
Against the Commonwealth and Compliance with the Commonwealth Fraud Control 
Guidelines.23  These  whole‐of‐government  reports  are  intended  to  inform 
government  and  relevant  entities24  of:  the  level  of  fraud detected within  the 
Commonwealth;  entities’  compliance  with  the  2011  Guidelines;  and  the 
effectiveness  of  fraud  control  policies  and  measures.  While  the  reports  are 
meant to be submitted annually, AGD has only done so three times in the past 
ten  years25;  and  the  remaining  reports were  submitted  between  two  and  26 
months late. Further, the Fraud Against the Commonwealth report due in 2010‐11 
has not yet been submitted—some  three years after  the due date—and at  the 
time of this audit there was no indication when it (and the reports for 2011‐12 
and  2012‐13)  would  be  made  available  to  government.  A  consolidated 
Compliance with  the Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines  report  for  2010‐13 
was  submitted  in March  2014, during  the  course  of  this  audit. Nonetheless, 
entities have continued to face compliance costs involved in providing annual 
information  updates  for  inclusion  in  the  reports,  while  the  Australian 
Government and  its entities have not had  the benefit of annual  reporting on 
key trends and developments.  
28. AGD and AIC  should establish a  formal arrangement  to  facilitate  the 
timely preparation  and  submission of  the Fraud  and Compliance Reports  to 
government.  
                                                     
23  The revised Guidance which took effect from 1 July 2014 also requires preparation of these reports. 
(Department of Finance, Resource Management Guide No. 201, Preventing Detecting and Dealing 
with Fraud, p. 21, paragraphs 12.3–12.4). 
24  The reports are not required to be made public. They are provided to the Minister for Justice and 
circulated to the Department of Finance and a number of other entities.  
25  In 2003, 2005 and 2009.  
  
ANAO Report No.3 2014–15 
Fraud Control Arrangements 
 
22 
26. Key  communication  and  advisory  mechanisms  include  the 
Commonwealth Fraud Control Network and Fraud Liaison Forum, as well as 
online  channels  such  as  dedicated  fraud  control  Govdex  and  Govspace 
websites.  During  2011‐13,  AGD  conducted  training  workshops  for  key 
personnel  and  seminars  to  assist  entities  with  establishing  and  maintaining 
appropriate  fraud  control  arrangements;  an  approach  intended  to  support 
entities  in  transitioning  to  the more contemporary, risk‐based and preventive 
approach to fraud control promoted in the 2011 Guidelines.  
27. The 2011 Guidelines required AGD, in cooperation with the Australian 
Institute  of Criminology  (AIC),  to produce  two key  reports  annually—Fraud 
Against the Commonwealth and Compliance with the Commonwealth Fraud Control 
Guidelines.23  These  whole‐of‐government  reports  are  intended  to  inform 
government  and  relevant  entities24  of:  the  level  of  fraud detected within  the 
Commonwealth;  entities’  compliance  with  the  2011  Guidelines;  and  the 
effectiveness  of  fraud  control  policies  and  measures.  While  the  reports  are 
meant to be submitted annually, AGD has only done so three times in the past 
ten  years25;  and  the  remaining  reports were  submitted  between  two  and  26 
months late. Further, the Fraud Against the Commonwealth report due in 2010‐11 
has not yet been submitted—some  three years after  the due date—and at  the 
time of this audit there was no indication when it (and the reports for 2011‐12 
and  2012‐13)  would  be  made  available  to  government.  A  consolidated 
Compliance with  the Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines  report  for  2010‐13 
was  submitted  in March  2014, during  the  course  of  this  audit. Nonetheless, 
entities have continued to face compliance costs involved in providing annual 
information  updates  for  inclusion  in  the  reports,  while  the  Australian 
Government and  its entities have not had  the benefit of annual  reporting on 
key trends and developments.  
28. AGD and AIC  should establish a  formal arrangement  to  facilitate  the 
timely preparation  and  submission of  the Fraud  and Compliance Reports  to 
government.  
                                                     
23  The revised Guidance which took effect from 1 July 2014 also requires preparation of these reports. 
(Department of Finance, Resource Management Guide No. 201, Preventing Detecting and Dealing 
with Fraud, p. 21, paragraphs 12.3–12.4). 
24  The reports are not required to be made public. They are provided to the Minister for Justice and 
circulated to the Department of Finance and a number of other entities.  
25  In 2003, 2005 and 2009.  
Summary 
 
ANAO Report No.3 2014–15 
Fraud Control Arrangements 
 
23 
Preventing fraud (Chapter 3) 
29. Fraud control within  the Commonwealth public sector has evolved  in 
recent years, with a move away from the more traditional approach focused on 
compliance,  detection  and  investigation  towards  a  more  contemporary 
approach  which  treats  fraud  control  and  prevention  as  core  elements  of 
corporate governance. The shift in orientation was strongly promoted through 
the 2011 Guidelines and was also  reflected  in  the Fraud Control BPG. A key 
feature of  the contemporary approach  is prevention, with well‐designed and 
implemented  strategies  to  prevent  fraud  considered  the  most  cost‐effective 
approach to managing fraud risks.  
30. Comcare approached fraud control as a key governance function. This 
approach  was  reflected  in  its  adoption  of  an  internal  fraud  prevention 
framework  which  included  a  fit‐for‐purpose  and  integrated  fraud  risk 






31. DVA’s  and  Austrade’s  approach  to  fraud  control  was  in  transition 
during  the  course  of  the  audit.  DVA  had  historically  focused  largely  on 
compliance, with a heavy emphasis on investigating fraud after it had occurred 
rather  than prevention. The department  commenced a  significant  restructure 
of its fraud control operations and governance in August 2013, rebalancing its 
approach  to  include more prevention  and deterrence  strategies  alongside  its 
existing  detection  strategies,  in  line  with  the  more  contemporary  approach. 
However, DVA’s approach  to date  in communicating  its revised expectations 
and  raising  fraud  awareness  among  staff,  has  not  been  fully  effective.  The 
relevant education online module was out of date and had not been promoted 
to  staff;  however,  at  the  time  of  the  audit,  DVA  had  already  commenced 
developing a new training framework to address this.  
32. Austrade has made more limited changes to its entity‐wide fraud control 
arrangements  since  the  introduction  of  the  2011  Guidelines,  and  aspects  of 
Austrade’s  internal management  arrangements  relating  to  fraud  control  have 
created  a  risk  of  fragmentation.  In  addition  to  a  whole‐of‐entity  fraud  unit 
located  in  its Corporate Services Group, Austrade has established a dedicated 
fraud  team within  its  Export Market Development Grants  (EMDG)  program, 
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fraud  team  in a high risk program area  is a  legitimate risk mitigation strategy; 
however,  there was  limited  communication  or  coordination  between  the  two 
units.  Austrade  advised  the  ANAO  that  the  fraud  control  function  and  the 
reporting of  fraud  is centralised  to  the  role of a senior executive. Nonetheless, 
Austrade continues  to report separately,  to  the Audit Committee and CEO, on 
the EMDG program and other entity activities,   and  there would be benefit  in 
considering  an  approach  involving  more  structured  cross‐communication 
between  fraud units  to strengthen coordination arrangements.  In  the course of 
the audit, Austrade advised the ANAO that an internal review of fraud control 
arrangements will examine consistency with  the Guidelines and ANAO Better 
Practice  Guide,  and  the  risk  of  fragmentation  between  fraud  management 
arrangements for EMDG and other parts of Austrade.   
33. Austrade’s biennial  risk assessment process was conducted on a  two‐
yearly  basis  consistent  with  the  2011  Guidelines.  As  part  of  that  process, 
Austrade  required  its  12  business  units  to  identify  fraud  risks  and  possible 
treatments;  however,  only  two  business  units  contributed.  Austrade  has 
advised  that  while  the  initial  processes  to  develop  the  draft  plan  were  not 
ideal,  senior  management  intervention  led  to  broader  consultation  and 
improvements in the process. It is by creating a shared responsibility for fraud 
control  amongst  staff  and  management  at  all  levels  that  an  entity  is  better 
placed  to  embed  fraud  control  as  part  of  its  governance  arrangements  and 
culture.  
34. Limitations  were  also  identified  in  Austrade’s  approach  to  fraud 
awareness training, with only one question on fraud appearing in the context 
of an on‐line security training module. Staff responses to a 2013 internal survey 
indicated  that  less  than  one  in  four  staff  could  correctly  identify  all  the 
potentially fraudulent or corrupt behaviours canvassed.  
Detecting and responding to fraud (Chapter 4) 
35. Fraud prevention strategies can help reduce, but not entirely eliminate, 
an  entity’s  fraud  risk.  Effective  fraud  detection  and  response  measures  are 
necessary  to  provide  assurance  that  perpetrators  of  fraudulent  acts  are 
identified, and appropriate action is taken.  
36. Broadly  speaking,  fraud  detection methods  can  be  passive  or  active. 
The  ANAO  examined  the  selected  entities’  implementation  of  the  passive 
detection  measures  discussed  in  the  Fraud  Control  BPG  and  found  that  all 
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improvements in the process. It is by creating a shared responsibility for fraud 
control  amongst  staff  and  management  at  all  levels  that  an  entity  is  better 
placed  to  embed  fraud  control  as  part  of  its  governance  arrangements  and 
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34. Limitations  were  also  identified  in  Austrade’s  approach  to  fraud 
awareness training, with only one question on fraud appearing in the context 
of an on‐line security training module. Staff responses to a 2013 internal survey 
indicated  that  less  than  one  in  four  staff  could  correctly  identify  all  the 
potentially fraudulent or corrupt behaviours canvassed.  
Detecting and responding to fraud (Chapter 4) 
35. Fraud prevention strategies can help reduce, but not entirely eliminate, 
an  entity’s  fraud  risk.  Effective  fraud  detection  and  response  measures  are 
necessary  to  provide  assurance  that  perpetrators  of  fraudulent  acts  are 
identified, and appropriate action is taken.  
36. Broadly  speaking,  fraud  detection methods  can  be  passive  or  active. 
The  ANAO  examined  the  selected  entities’  implementation  of  the  passive 
detection  measures  discussed  in  the  Fraud  Control  BPG  and  found  that  all 
Summary 
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processed  by  individual  business units. Reflecting Austrade’s  administrative 
arrangements discussed above, Austrade’s  central  fraud  control unit did not 
always  have  visibility  of  the  review processes  adopted  by  business units  or 
responses to fraud across the entity. This approach further fragmented internal 
fraud  control  arrangements;  introducing  a  risk  of  inconsistent  handling  and 
processing of  tip‐offs, and a situation where  fraud  risks were not necessarily 
monitored or communicated within Austrade.  
37. Each  of  the  selected  entities  employed  a  range  of  active  detection 
methods;  with  the  specific  measures  adopted  by  entities  reflecting  their 
differing business operations. The  two payment entities, Comcare and DVA, 
regularly undertook  a wide  variety  of  statistical  analysis  aimed  at detecting 




38. DVA  is  required,  by  the Data‐matching  Program Act  1990,  to  perform 
data matching analysis. Comcare has also added data matching to its range of 
active  detection  measures,  although  it  is  not  mandated.  The  use  of  data 
matching by DVA and Comcare has identified potential cases of fraud.  
39. Consistent  with  the  2011  Guidelines,  Comcare  and  DVA  maintained 
fraud  incident  registers which were used  to  inform  their CEO of  the  level of 





investigation  manual,  standardised  assessment  templates  and  a  case 
prioritisation  model  to  assess  and  prioritise  fraud  allegations.  DVA  had  an  
out‐of‐date  investigation  manual  and  the  department  advised  it  was  in  the 
process of updating  the manual. DVA had  implemented a case prioritisation 
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Monitoring and reviewing fraud arrangements (Chapter 5) 
41. In  the  context  of  an  evolving  business  and  operating  environment, 
entities can help manage their risks by employing a flexible rolling program of 
reviews, audits and evaluations, and by actively  looking  for opportunities  to 
improve fraud control arrangements.  
42. The selected entities  reviewed  their  risk assessments every  two years, 
and  their  Fraud  Control  Plans  were  updated  following  those  exercises. 
Comcare and DVA also had established processes to review poorly performing 
controls,  and  liaised with  their  relevant  business  areas  to  identify  scope  for 
improvement in the control framework.  
43. Effective  internal  reporting  can  inform  an  entityʹs  management  of 
fraud  control  arrangements  by  identifying  trends,  weaknesses  and 
opportunities  for  improvement.  The  selected  entitiesʹ  internal  reporting  to 
their  respective  audit  committees  (and  through  the  audit  committee  to  the 
CEO) were  generally  aligned,  in  terms  of process  and  content,  to  the  2011 
Guidelines and better practice discussed in the ANAOʹs Fraud Control BPG. 
However,  Austrade  did  not  adopt  a  centralised  recording  system,  and  its 
individual  fraud  units  reported  separately  to  its  audit  committee  and 
executive,  albeit  through  a  nominated  senior  officer.  Further,  Austrade’s 
audit  committee  received  limited  information  on  the  outcome  of 
investigations, prosecutions and civil actions.  
44. External  reporting promotes accountability,  informs government  and 
stakeholders  of  developments,  and  facilitates  whole‐of‐government 
monitoring  and  responses  to  fraud  risks.  The  selected  entities  generally 
complied  with  the  external  reporting  requirements  in  the  2011  Guidelines, 
reported  internally and externally on  fraud risk and  fraud control measures, 
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Summary of entities’ responses 


















performance  audit  will  make  a  valuable  contribution  to  the  future 
development of Commonwealth fraud control arrangements. 
Australian Trade Commission 
The  ANAOʹs  observations  provide  helpful  guidance  to  enable  Austrade  to 
further  improve  its  fraud  control  and  management  arrangements,  develop 
greater consistency with  the ANAO Better Practice Guide  for Fraud Control, 
and further strengthen fraud reporting within Austrade. 
As  recognised  in  the ANAOʹs  report,  the Export Market Development Grant 
(EMDG) scheme represents Austradeʹs highest fraud risk. While the ANAOʹs 
performance  audit  of  the  EMDG  scheme  will  cover  specific  fraud  control 
arrangements within that scheme, given that audit is still being conducted, it is 
worth  noting  here  that  on  balance,  a  considerable  proportion  of Austradeʹs 
fraud control effort is directed toward that scheme. 
I also can advise that since the audit Austrade has: 
• established  a  centralised  fraud management database  to  capture 
data and facilitate reporting of fraud related matters; 
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• implemented  a  comprehensive  fraud  investigation  procedures 
manual; 
• established  a  fraud  whistle‐blower  hotline,  with  reporting 
information  now  published  on  the  agency  website  and  the 
intranet; and 
• reviewed  the annual  fraud awareness  training module which all 
staff are required to undertake. 
Comcare 
The  findings and  recommendations of  the  report are noted and accepted by 
Comcare.  
Following  a  recent  internal  restructure,  Comcare’s  Claims  and  Liability 
Management and Scheme Management and Regulation divisions are working 
closely  together  and  with  Comcare’s  Chief  Finance  Officer,  to  further  refine 
Comcare’s  approach  to  managing  risk,  fraud  control  and  investigation.  The 




generally compliant with  the mandatory  requirements under  the 2011 Fraud 
Control Guidelines. 
DVA agrees with the audit findings and acknowledges the recommendation.  
The  report  acknowledges  that  DVA  is  in  a  transition  phase  with  the 
implementation of its fraud and non‐compliance reform programme.  
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To  facilitate  the  timely  preparation  of  the  annual  Fraud 
Against the Commonwealth Report and the annual Compliance 
Report  to  Government,  the  ANAO  recommends  that  the 
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This chapter  contains background  information about  fraud  control  in  the Australian 
Government  public  sector,  as well  as  details  about  the  audit  objective,  criteria  and 
approach. 
What is fraud? 
1.1 Fraud against the Commonwealth is defined as ʹdishonestly obtaining a 
benefit,  or  causing  a  loss,  by deception  or  other meansʹ.26  Fraud  against  the 
Commonwealth  can  be  broadly  categorised  as  being  either  external  (fraud 
committed  by  clients  or  customers,  service  providers  and  members  of  the 
public) or  internal  (fraud committed by employees and contractors).  In some 
cases,  fraud  against  the  Commonwealth  may  involve  collusion  between 
external  and  internal  parties,  which  may  not  only  result  in  loss  for  the 
Commonwealth,  but may  also  involve  corrupt  conduct  such  as  bribery  and 
secret commissions.  





1.3 Fraud  threats are ongoing and  can affect any Australian Government 
entity.  In  2010–11,  external  and  internal  fraud  losses  against  the 
Commonwealth were estimated at $119 million. 27 Approximately $116 million 
of  these  estimated  losses  related  to  external  fraud,  while  some  $3  million 
related to internal fraud.  




26  The definition incorporates ‘a mental or fault element to fraud; it requires more than carelessness, 
accident or error.’ See Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines 
2011, March 2011, AGD, Canberra, p. 5.  
27  The ANAO was provided with unpublished data from the 2010–11 survey of Australian Government 
entities conducted by the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) for the annual report on ‘Fraud 
Against the Commonwealth’. The most recent published report was Fraud Against the Commonwealth 
in 2009–10.   
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 establishing  (and  maintaining)  a  sufficient  level  of  awareness  and 
understanding  among  staff  and  contractors,  and  as  appropriate, 
external stakeholders, about the entity’s approach to fraud control; 
 providing (or acquiring) specialised fraud training for key staff; 
 appropriately  responding  to  fraud  events,  including  taking  corrective 
action; and 
 monitoring, reporting and evaluating fraud control strategies. 
The Australian Government’s fraud control framework 
1.5 Australian Government agencies have  long been  required  to establish 
arrangements  to  deal with  the  risks  of  fraud.  The  Financial Management  and 
Accountability  Act  1997  (FMA  Act),  which  operated  during  the  course  of 
fieldwork  for  this  audit,  placed  a  number  of  ʹspecial  responsibilitiesʹ  on  the 
Chief Executives of FMA Act agencies. For example, section 44 of the FMA Act 
required  Chief  Executives  to  promote  the  proper  use  of  Commonwealth 
resources,  while  section  45  required  the  implementation  of  a  fraud  control 
plan. In addition, section 64 and FMA Regulation 16A made provision for the 
responsible  minister  (the  Minister  for  Justice)  to  issue  Fraud  Control 
Guidelines.  
The Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines 
1.6 At  the  time  of  the  audit  fieldwork,  the  Australian  Governmentʹs 
framework  for  fraud  control was  set  out  in  the  2011 Commonwealth  Fraud 
Control  Guidelines  (2011  Guidelines).  The  2011  Guidelines  established  the 
fraud  control  policy  framework  within  which  entities  were  expected  to 
determine  their  own  specific practices, plans  and procedures  to manage  the 
prevention and detection of fraudulent activities.  
1.7 The  2011  Guidelines  contained  a  mix  of  mandatory  fraud  control 
requirements  and  other  recommended  practices  as  a  basis  for  sound  fraud 
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 implementation of a program of general  fraud awareness  training  for 






focused  on  embedding  fraud  control  and  prevention  as  part  of  an  entityʹs 
culture and governance arrangements; a senior  leadership responsibility. The 
ANAOʹs 2011 Better Practice Guide on Fraud Control  in Australian Government 
Entities  (the  Fraud  Control  BPG)  described  this  as  a  ʹcontemporaryʹ 





common  practice  in  government  entities,  fraud  control  strategies  need  to 
mature and become an accepted part of the day‐to‐day running of entities.   




1.10 The  fraud  control  policy  framework  and  2011  Guidelines  were 
administered by  the Attorney‐Generalʹs Department  (AGD), which provided 
advice  to agencies on  the Guidelines and had responsibility  for advising and 
reporting to ministers on whole‐of‐government fraud control arrangements.  
Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 
1.11 The  basis  of  the  fraud  control  framework  altered  from  1  July  2014, 
when the FMA Act and Regulations were replaced by a new Fraud Rule made 
pursuant  to  the  Public  Governance,  Performance  and  Accountability  Act  2013 
(PGPA Act).  The 2011 Guidelines were also replaced on 1 July 2014 by a Guide  
issued by the Minister for Justice under the Fraud Rule, and a Commonwealth 
Fraud  Control  Policy.    AGD  continues  to  administer  the  fraud  control 
framework. 
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Previous ANAO audits and the Better Practice Guide 
1.12 This  audit  continues  the Australian National Audit Office’s  (ANAO) 
examination  of  Commonwealth  entities’  fraud  control  arrangements.  The 
ANAO has  conducted  several audits  in  recent years on  fraud  control28, with 
the most recent audit tabled in 2009–10.29 In 2011, the ANAO also released its 
updated  Better  Practice  Guide  on  Fraud  Control  in  Australian  Government 
Entities (the Fraud Control BPG).  
Audit objective and approach 
1.13 The audit objective was to examine the selected entities’ effectiveness in 
implementing  entity‐wide  fraud  control  arrangements,  including  compliance 
with  the  requirements of  the 2011 Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines  
(2011  Guidelines),  and  the  overall  administration  of  the  fraud  control 
framework by the Attorney‐General’s Department (AGD).  
1.14 To  form a  conclusion against  the audit objective,  the ANAO adopted 
the following high‐level criteria: 





‐ processes  to  monitor,  evaluate  and  report  on  fraud  control 
arrangements; and 
 AGD  effectively  administered  the  fraud  control  framework  and 
supported entities, as required by  the Guidelines,  following release of 
the 2011 Guidelines.   
1.15 In  addition  to  examining  AGD’s  overall  administration  of  the  fraud 
control framework, the ANAO examined the department’s implementation of 
the  ANAO’s  most  recent  performance  audit  on  fraud  control  (Table  1.1).30 
Further,  the  ANAO  examined  the  relationship  between  AGD  and  the 
                                                     
28  A full list of recent ANAO Audit Reports that examine Commonwealth entities’ fraud control 
arrangements is contained in Appendix 2. 
29  ANAO Report No.42 2009–10 Fraud Control in Australian Government Agencies. 
30  ibid. 
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28  A full list of recent ANAO Audit Reports that examine Commonwealth entities’ fraud control 
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29  ANAO Report No.42 2009–10 Fraud Control in Australian Government Agencies. 
30  ibid. 
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Australian  Institute of Criminology  (AIC)31, relating  to  the production of  two 
annual reports to government: Fraud Against the Commonwealth (Fraud Report); 
and  Compliance with  the  Commonwealth  Fraud  Control Guidelines  (Compliance 
Report).  




The ANAO recommends that the Attorney-General’s Department, in its 
review of the Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines (the Guidelines), 
takes the opportunity to: 
 consult with the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) and 
consider approaches that will allow the AIC to collect, analyse and 
disseminate fraud trend data on a more consistent basis; 
 continue to work with the Department of Finance and Deregulation 
to clarify which CAC Act bodies are subject to the Guidelines; and 
 consider the merits of establishing an approach for the provision of 
fraud control advice and information to Australian Government 
agencies, particularly to smaller sized agencies, that facilitates the 
provision and exchange of practical fraud control advice. 
Recommendation 
No. 2 
The ANAO recommends that agencies reassess their fraud risks and, 
where appropriate, the effectiveness of existing fraud control strategies, 
when undergoing a significant change in role, structure or function, or 
when implementing a substantially new program or service delivery 
arrangement. 
Source: ANAO Audit Report No.42 2009–10 Fraud Control in Australian Government Agencies. 
1.16 The  audit  did  not  examine  the  selected  entities’  actions  following  a 
decision  to  investigate  possible  fraudulent  activities.  Nor  did  the  audit 
examine the role of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) or the Commonwealth 
Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  in  investigating  allegations  of  fraud  and 
conducting prosecutions.  
1.17 Separately, the ANAO is conducting a performance audit of Austrade’s 
Export  Management  Development  Grants  (EMDG)  program,  including  its 
fraud  control  arrangements.  The  current  audit  is  focussed  on  Austrade’s 
entity‐wide  arrangements,  and  did  not  examine  the  administration  of  the 
EMDG  except  to  the  extent  of  its  alignment  with  Austrade’s  overarching 
governance framework for fraud control. 
                                                     
31  The AIC is a separate entity within the Attorney-General’s portfolio. It was not designated as an 
audited entity for this report. 
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1.18 In  conducting  this  audit,  the ANAO:  interviewed  relevant  officers  in 
each  of  the  selected  entities,  AGD  and  the  AIC;  examined  relevant 
documentation,  controls  and  systems;  and  examined  whether  entities  had 
regard to better practice as discussed in the ANAO’s 2011 Fraud Control BPG. 
1.19 The  audit  was  conducted  in  accordance  with  the  ANAO  auditing 
standards at an approximate cost to the ANAO of $491 296. 







Table 1.2 Role of selected entities 
Audited entity Role 
AGD The Attorney-General’s portfolio provides expert advice and services on a 
range of law and justice, national security and emergency management 
issues.  
AGD is responsible for coordinating fraud control policy, including: 
 the administration of the Guidelines; 
 promoting the use of risk management techniques within Australian 
Government departments and agencies;  
 promoting better practice in fraud control, including the development of 
fraud standards; and 
 providing advice on fraud control to the Australian Government. 
Austrade Austrade advances Australia’s trade, investment, tourism and education 
promotion interests through information, advice and services to business, 
the education sector and governments in developing international 
markets. Austrade also provides consular and passport services in 
specific locations overseas. 
Comcare Comcare partners with workers, their employers and unions to keep 
workers healthy and safe, and reduce the incidence and cost of workplace 
injury and disease. It is also responsible for managing Commonwealth 
common law liabilities for asbestos compensation. 
DVA DVA is the entity with primary responsibility for developing and 
implementing programs that provide services and support to the veteran 
and defence force communities. DVA provides programs of care, 
compensation and commemoration for eligible customers. 
Source: ANAO summary from entities’ Portfolio Budget Statements and Annual Reports.  
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1.18 In  conducting  this  audit,  the ANAO:  interviewed  relevant  officers  in 
each  of  the  selected  entities,  AGD  and  the  AIC;  examined  relevant 
documentation,  controls  and  systems;  and  examined  whether  entities  had 
regard to better practice as discussed in the ANAO’s 2011 Fraud Control BPG. 
1.19 The  audit  was  conducted  in  accordance  with  the  ANAO  auditing 
standards at an approximate cost to the ANAO of $491 296. 
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1.22 Table  1.3 provides  further  information  about Austrade, Comcare  and 
DVA,  to  establish  the  context  in  which  their  fraud  control  arrangements 
operate. 
Table 1.3 Contextual information about the selected entities 
 Austrade Comcare Department of 
Veterans’ Affairs 
Entity type during 
course of the audit 
FMA Act CAC Act FMA Act 





 Internal fraud by 
Austrade staff 
within Australia or 
overseas. 
 Fraudulent claims 







 Fraudulent claims 
by clients and 
service providers. 
Number of staff (as 
at June 2013) 
1003 712 2058 
Number of staff 
dedicated to Fraud 
Control Areas (as 
at June 2013) 








major offices in 
Sydney and 
Canberra. 
Offices in most states 
and territories. 
Offices in every state, 
major offices in 
Canberra and 
Queensland. 
Source: ANAO summary from agencies’ Portfolio Budget Statements, Submissions to the AIC and Annual 
Reports.  
Notes: A: Comcare was not directly appropriated due to its status as a CAC Act entity. Appropriations 
were made to the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, and 
subsequently paid to Comcare.  
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Table 1.4 Structure of the report 
Chapter Issues examined 
2 Whole-of-Government 
Arrangements for Fraud Control  
This chapter examines whole-of-government 
arrangements for the administration of fraud control, 
including reporting by AGD on compliance with the 
Fraud Control Guidelines. 
3 Preventing Fraud This chapter examines the selected entities’ fraud 
prevention strategies, including governance, risk 
assessment, communication, training and key 
internal controls.  
4 Detecting and Responding to Fraud This chapter examines whether the selected entities 
have effective systems and processes in place 
designed to detect and respond to instances of 
fraud. 
5 Monitoring and Reviewing Fraud 
Control Arrangements 
This chapter examines whether the selected entities 
have effective processes for monitoring and 
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Arrangements for Fraud Control 
This  chapter  examines whole‐of‐government  arrangements  for  the  administration  of 




by  the  then Minister  for  Justice  in 2011. The Guidelines set out  the  following 
whole‐of‐government roles32: 
 the Australian Federal Police are  responsible  for  investigating  serious 
or complex crime against the Commonwealth, which can  include both 
internal and external fraud; 
 the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions  is  responsible  for 
conducting  the  prosecution  of  offences  relating  to  breaches  of 
Commonwealth law; and 
 the  Attorney‐General’s  Department  (AGD)  is  responsible  for 
developing  high‐level  policy  advice  to  government  in  relation  to  the 
Commonwealth’s  fraud  control  arrangements,  and  for  the  whole‐of‐
government  administration  of  the  Guidelines.  These  responsibilities 
include producing  an Annual Compliance Report  and  in  conjunction 
with  the  Australian  Institute  of  Criminology  (AIC),  producing  the 




32  The revised Guidance which took effect from 1 July 2014 also documents whole-of-government 
arrangements. (Department of Finance, Resource Management Guide No. 201, Preventing Detecting 
and Dealing with Fraud, p. 6). 
33  Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines, Canberra, AGD, March 
2011, p. 21, paragraph 12.3. 
34  ANAO comment: Under current Ministerial arrangements, the reports are to be provided to the Minister 
for Justice.  
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Advice to government 
2.3 The whole‐of‐government framework for fraud control  is documented 
in  policy  and  guidance  which  has  been  regularly  updated.  The  responsible 
Minister issued fraud control Guidelines under the FMA Act and Regulations 
in  2002  and  again  in  2011,  and  as  discussed  below,  revised  guidance  was 
released  in  2014  to  coincide  with  the  operation  of  the  new  fraud  control 
framework under the PGPA Act and rules.  
2.4  The department has also  sought  to address  specific  issues  relating  to 
the  operation  of  the  framework.  For  example,  the  ANAO’s  2009–10 
performance  audit  of  Fraud  Control  in  Australian  Government  Agencies 
recommended that AGD continue to work with the Department of Finance to 
clarify  which  Commonwealth  Authorities  and  Companies  Act  1997  (CAC  Act) 
bodies were  subject  to  the Guidelines.35 AGD agreed  to  the  recommendation 
and  initiated a review  in 2011 relating  to  the application of  the Guidelines  to 
CAC Act entities. In  the course of  this audit, AGD advised  the ANAO  that  it 
commenced work  to develop  a Government Policy Order  aimed  at  enabling 
the mandatory application of the Guidelines to CAC Act entities; an initiative 
with  the  potential  to  close  a  gap  in  the  Commonwealth’s  fraud  control 
framework, as CAC Act entities were not subject to the Guidelines.  
2.5 Work on the draft General Policy Order was suspended in 2012 due to 





35  The audit found that ‘there was a lack of visibility as to which CAC Act bodies have (or have not) 
received a notification (from their responsible Minister) to apply the Guidelines’ (see paragraph 3.14, 
ANAO Audit Report No. 42, 2009-10). See Appendix 3 of this audit for a list of recommendations from 
the earlier audit, and the full response by AGD. 
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35  The audit found that ‘there was a lack of visibility as to which CAC Act bodies have (or have not) 
received a notification (from their responsible Minister) to apply the Guidelines’ (see paragraph 3.14, 
ANAO Audit Report No. 42, 2009-10). See Appendix 3 of this audit for a list of recommendations from 
the earlier audit, and the full response by AGD. 
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of  committees  established  by  [the  Department  of  Finance]  to  oversee  the 
development of the Commonwealth’s new financial management framework. 
Finance  has  also  publically  consulted  on  the  draft  fraud  rule  which  will 
underpin fraud control under the PGPA framework. The rule sets out the key 
principles  of  fraud  control  from  the  Guidelines  to  ensure  continued 
appropriate  fraud  control  measures. The  rule  is  supported  by  guidance 
material  drawn  from  the  detail  of  the  Guidelines.  The  rule  and  guidance 
material have gone  to  the  Joint Committee on Public Accounts and Audit as 
part of its enquiry into the PGPA Act.36  
Work  on  the  new  fraud  framework  is  continuing.  AGD  is  reviewing  the 
content of the Guidelines in developing guidance material to support the new 
fraud  rule. AGD  is consulting with PGPA Act and  fraud stakeholders  in  the 
development of this guidance. Consideration may also be given to elements of 
the guidance which would benefit from elevation to a policy.  
2.6 The  basis  of  the  fraud  control  framework  altered  from  1  July  2014, 
when the FMA Act and Regulations were replaced by a new Fraud Rule made 
pursuant  to  the  Public  Governance,  Performance  and  Accountability  Act  2013 
(PGPA  Act).37  The  2011  Guidelines  were  also  replaced  on  1  July  2014  by  a 
Guide38  issued  by  the  Minister  for  Justice  under  the  Fraud  Rule,  and  a 
Commonwealth  Fraud  Control  Policy.39  AGD  continues  to  administer  the 
fraud control framework. 
2.7 In  the context of  the new  resource management  framework operating 
from 1 July 2014, and related changes to government policies such as the Fraud 
                                                     
36  ANAO comment: The JCPAA released its report on the PGPA Act in May 2014. See Report 441, 
Inquiry into Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 Rules Development, 
available from <http://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/Committees/Joint/JCPAA/44p/PGPA-
ACT2013/Final%20Report.pdf>[ accessed 19 May 2014].  
37  The Fraud Rule states that it is intended to establish a minimum standard for managing the risk and 
incidents of fraud. It provides that entities must take all reasonable measures to prevent, detect and 
deal with fraud relating to the entity, including by: conducting fraud risk assessments; developing and 
implementing a fraud control plan; and having an appropriate mechanism for preventing, detecting, 
investigating, recording and reporting fraud.  
38  The Guide indicates that it is ‘non-binding, but provides best practice to assist accountable authorities 
to meet their obligations under the fraud rule.’ Resource Management Guide No.201: Preventing, 
detecting and dealing with fraud, July 2014, p.5.  
39  The Policy contains procedural requirements which supplement the Fraud Rule. Section 21 of the 
PGPA Act requires that an entity be governed in a way that is not inconsistent with government 
policies.   
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provision  of  fraud  control  advice  and  information  to  entities, particularly  to 
smaller  sized  entities,  that  facilitates  the provision and  exchange of practical 
fraud control advice.40 AGD agreed to the recommendation and subsequently 
developed two websites to support and advise entities: Govspace and Govdex. 
AGD  also maintains  a  specific  fraud  enquiry  email  address which  facilitates 
entity requests for advice on fraud control matters. 
2.10 Govspace is a publicly available website which aims to: provide advice 
on  how  to  report  fraud  against  the  Commonwealth;  promote  awareness 











and  apply  to  entities.  AGD  also  advised  that  it  would  be  using  Govdex  to 
                                                     
40  The audit found that smaller agencies (less than 249 employees) made up the largest percentage of 
agencies that were not meeting the mandatory fraud external reporting requirements. In addition, 
smaller agencies accounted for the largest percentage of agencies without a fraud policy statement, 
fraud risk assessment and fraud control plans (paragraphs 3.26–27). See Appendix 3 for a list of 
recommendations from the audit, and the full response by AGD. 
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release  an  electronic  whole‐of‐Government  e‐learning  fraud  awareness 
package for all Commonwealth entities. 
2.13 The fraud managers at Comcare and DVA advised the ANAO that they 
had  found  the  Govdex  and  Govspace  websites  useful,  and  had  used  the 
websites to: obtain contact details for other entities; review fraud control plans; 
and review other entities’ fraud control arrangements. While Austrade had not 
previously utilised  the Govdex or Govspace websites,  it established access  to 
Govdex on 19 June 2014.   






 the Fraud Liaison Forum—an annual  forum open  to all  fraud  control 




support  entities  in  their  transition  to  the  revised  fraud  control  framework 
under the PGPA Act. 
2.16 AGD  has  provided  further  support  and  training  to  entities  through 
workshops and seminars on  fraud control matters, as well as participating  in 
fraud control groups formed by other entities. These initiatives have included:  





 a  risk  assessment workshop  (May  2012)—targeting  small  to medium 
size entities with existing but limited fraud control capacity.  The aim of 
the  workshop  was  to  identify  best  practice  and  facilitate  sharing  of 
information and practices within similar entities;  
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 assistance  to  the  Australian  Federal  Police  to  run  Commonwealth 
Agency Investigator Workshops; and 
 a whole‐of‐Government e‐learning fraud awareness training package to 
assist entities  to understand  the new  fraud  framework and meet  their 
obligations under the PGPA Act. 
2.17 Of the selected entities, Comcare advised the ANAO that its personnel 
had  attended  some  of  the  workshops  and  sessions  provided  by  AGD  and 
stated that these sessions had been  
… useful to understand the approaches that other agencies adopted to develop 
risk  assessments.  [The workshop]  enabled us  to build ongoing  relationships 
with other agencies and share information on common risks and controls. 
2.18 DVA  and  Austrade  advised  that  they  had  not  attended  any  of  the 
workshops or sessions provided by AGD. 




engagement  activities  discussed  in  the  previous  section  provide  a  basis  for 
AGD  to  keep  abreast  of  developments  within  entities  and  in  the  broader 
environment,  so  as  to  advise  entities  and  government.  In  addition,  the 
Guidelines  provide  for  the  preparation  of  annual  fraud  and  compliance 
reports41  which  are  the  main  channel  through  which  the  Government  is 
informed  of  the  current  status  of  fraud  control  arrangements,  including 
entities’ compliance with the Guidelines and the level of fraud detected within 
entities. 
2.20 Preparation  of  the  reports  is  partly  a  shared  responsibility  between 
AGD and AIC. The Guidelines state that:  
                                                     
41  In this report, these two reports are called the Fraud Against the Commonwealth Report and the 
Annual Compliance Report. 
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The  AIC,  in  consultation  with  the  AGD  and  AFP,  will  provide  an  annual 
report on fraud against the Commonwealth and fraud control arrangements in 
Australian  Government  agencies  to  the  Minister  for  Home  Affairs.42  This 
report  will  also  be  provided  to  Ministers,  Presiding  Officers  and  Chief 
Executives...  





Annual fraud and compliance reports 
Fraud against the Commonwealth Report 








each  other,  and  other  entities,  to  develop  the  survey  material  sent  to  the 
entities to collect data for the Report.45 However, there is no formal agreement 
between AGD and AIC  to support  the preparation of  the annual  report, and 
there would  be  benefit  in  the  entities  entering  into  such  an  arrangement  to 
support  the  timely preparation of  the report—which has been problematic  in 
recent years. 
2.24 The  ANAO  examined  the  release  date  of  the  Fraud  Against  the 
Commonwealth  Report  since  its  inception,  and  found  that  there  was  not  a 
consistent annual cycle for the publication of the report (Table 2.1). 
                                                     
42  ANAO comment: Responsibility for preparing the annual Fraud Against the Commonwealth Report 
was transferred from AGD to AIC in 2007.  
43  Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines, Canberra, AGD, March 
2011, paragraph 12.3, p.21. 
44  ibid., p. 21. 
45  ibid. 
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Date report was sent 





2002–03 AGD No February 2004 — 
2003–04 AGD No December 2004 10 months 
2004–05 AGD No July 2006 19 months 
2005–06 AGD No March 2007  9 months 
2006–07 AIC No September 2008 16 months 
2007–08 AIC No November 2009 14 months 
2008–09 AIC Yes April 2011 17 months 
2009–10 AIC Yes March 2012 11 months 
2010–11 
2011–12B 
AIC Proposed Not yet released At October 2014, 31 months 
Source: ANAO summary of data from AGD. 
Notes: A: In 2007, responsibility for preparing the annual Fraud Against the Commonwealth Report was 
transferred from the Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) to the Australian Institute of 
Criminology (AIC). 




a  consolidated  report—including  information  on  the  number  of  suspected 
fraud incidents, the response to these incidents by reporting entities, and if any 
legal  remedies  had  been  sought  in  response  to  these  incidents—for  three 
consecutive  years.  AGD  advised  the  ANAO  on  7 December  2013,  that  the 
report  had  not  been  produced  due  to  ‘new  reporting  requirements  and 
changes to the survey  in 2011 [which]  led to delays  in the AIC collecting and 
collating data on the survey.’   
2.26 Notwithstanding  the continued delays  in  releasing  the  report, entities 
were  required  to  annually  submit  information  to  AGD  for  inclusion  in  the 
report. The  three entities examined  in  this audit advised  the ANAO  that  the 
annual  compilation of  this  information was a  significant administrative  task, 
particularly in a resource constrained environment.  
2.27 The annual consolidation of current and reliable  information on  fraud 
was intended to enable the Government and entities to monitor and respond to 
emerging  risks,  threats  and  other  developments  in  a  timely  manner.  The 
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Notes: A: In 2007, responsibility for preparing the annual Fraud Against the Commonwealth Report was 
transferred from the Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) to the Australian Institute of 
Criminology (AIC). 




a  consolidated  report—including  information  on  the  number  of  suspected 
fraud incidents, the response to these incidents by reporting entities, and if any 
legal  remedies  had  been  sought  in  response  to  these  incidents—for  three 
consecutive  years.  AGD  advised  the  ANAO  on  7 December  2013,  that  the 
report  had  not  been  produced  due  to  ‘new  reporting  requirements  and 
changes to the survey  in 2011 [which]  led to delays  in the AIC collecting and 
collating data on the survey.’   
2.26 Notwithstanding  the continued delays  in  releasing  the  report, entities 
were  required  to  annually  submit  information  to  AGD  for  inclusion  in  the 
report. The  three entities examined  in  this audit advised  the ANAO  that  the 
annual  compilation of  this  information was a  significant administrative  task, 
particularly in a resource constrained environment.  
2.27 The annual consolidation of current and reliable  information on  fraud 
was intended to enable the Government and entities to monitor and respond to 
emerging  risks,  threats  and  other  developments  in  a  timely  manner.  The 
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cost  to all  entities which are  required  to provide annual  input  to  the  report, 
and  have  meant  that  the  government  has  not  had  the  benefit  of  annual 
reporting on key trends and developments. 
2.28 In its 2009–10 audit report, the ANAO recommended that AGD consult 
with  the  AIC  and  consider  approaches  that  will  allow  the  AIC  to  collect, 
analyse  and disseminate  fraud  trend data on  a more  consistent basis.  In  the 
context of the current audit, AGD advised the ANAO that:  
…  it  had  consulted with AIC which  has  led  to  improvements  in  the  fraud 
control survey and the analysis of fraud data.46 
Annual Compliance Report 
2.29 The Guidelines also require AGD to provide the Government, through 
the  responsible  Minister47,  with  an  ‘annual  compliance  report...on  whole‐of‐
government  compliance with  the  requirements  of  the Guidelines’.48 As with 
the Fraud Against the Commonwealth Report, the compliance report has not been 




2.30 A  significant  finding  reported  in  the  draft  Annual  Compliance  Report 
(2010–11  and  2011–12)  is  that,  in  2011–12,  most  entities  which  were  
non‐compliant with  the  risk  assessments  or  fraud  control plan  requirements 
were either new entities or entities that were previously CAC Act entities. The 
draft Annual Compliance Report also identifies that between 2010–11 and 2011–




46  AGD’s full response regarding the implementation of the recommendation made in the ANAO’s 
previous audit appears in Appendix 3.  
47  The Guidelines refer to the then Minister for Home Affairs as the responsible Minister. At present, the 
responsible Minister is the Minister for Justice. 
48  Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines, Canberra, AGD, 
March 2011, paragraph. 12.3. 
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…  the  Compliance  Report  was  delayed  and  not  prepared  annually  for  the 
years from 2011–13 as [AGD] did not received the necessary data from the AIC 
in order to produce the report on time. When [AGD] received the relevant data 




AIC  relating  to  the  preparation  of  the  two  reports.  To  strengthen  their 
relationship, AGD should consider negotiating formal arrangements with AIC 
focussing on the timely preparation of the reports on an annual basis. 
Recommendation No.1  
2.33 To  facilitate  the  timely  preparation  of  the  annual  Fraud  Against  the 
Commonwealth  Report  and  the  annual  Compliance  Report  to  Government,  the 




Against  the  Commonwealth  Report  and  the  Report  on  Compliance  with  the 





2.35 AGDʹs  overall  administration  of  the  Australian  Governmentʹs  fraud 
control framework has been generally effective. The department administers a 
well‐developed  whole‐of‐government  framework  for  fraud  control  which 
includes: documented policy and guidance which has been regularly updated; 
clear  assignment  of  the  respective  roles  and  responsibilities  of  AGD  and 
entities; and identified points of co‐ordination. The framework is supported by 
whole‐of‐government advisory arrangements  intended  to  inform government 
and  entities  of  key  developments,  and  formal  mechanisms  to  support  and 
maintain communication with entities on policy and other developments.  
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2.36 Key  communication  and  advisory  mechanisms  include  the 
Commonwealth Fraud Control Network and Fraud Liaison Forum, as well as 
online  channels  such  as  dedicated  fraud  control  Govdex  and  Govspace 
websites.  During  2011‐13,  AGD  conducted  training  workshops  for  key 
personnel  and  seminars  to  assist  entities  with  establishing  and  maintaining 




Institute  of Criminology  (AIC),  to produce  two key  reports  annually—Fraud 
Against  the  Commonwealth  (the  Fraud  Report)  and  Compliance  with  the 
Commonwealth  Fraud  Control  Guidelines  (the  Compliance  Report).49  These 
whole‐of‐government reports are intended to inform government and relevant 






at  the  time of  this audit  there was no  indication when  it  (and  the reports  for  
2011–12 and 2012–13) would be made available  to government. Nonetheless, 
entities have continued to face compliance costs involved in providing annual 
information  updates  for  inclusion  in  the  reports,  while  the  Australian 
Government and  its entities have not had  the benefit of annual  reporting on 
key trends and developments.  
2.38 AGD and AIC  should establish a  formal arrangement  to  facilitate  the 
timely preparation  and  submission of  the Fraud  and Compliance Reports  to 
government. 
                                                     
49  The revised Guidance which took effect from 1 July 2014 also requires preparation of these reports. 
(Department of Finance, Resource Management Guide No. 201, Preventing Detecting and Dealing 
with Fraud, p. 21, paragraphs 12.3–12.4). 
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3. Preventing Fraud 





an  organisation.50  A  number  of  elements  are  necessary  for  effective  fraud 
prevention,  including:  senior  leadership  which  promotes  an  ethical  internal 
culture;  an  appropriate  level of  awareness  about  fraud‐related  issues  among 
staff  and  contractors;  a  risk‐based  approach  to  identifying,  assessing  and 
treating risks; and well‐designed and implemented internal control measures. 
3.2 Fraud control within  the Commonwealth public sector has evolved  in 
recent years from having a largely compliance focus to now being considered a 
core  element  of  corporate  governance.  The  Commonwealth  Fraud  Control 
Guidelines  (the  Guidelines),  for  example,  highlight  the  role  of  entity  Chief 
Executive  Officers  (CEOs)  in  developing  a  ‘strong  fraud  prevention  culture 
within their agencies.’51 Similarly, the ANAO’s Better Practice Guide on Fraud 
Control in Australian Government Entities (the Fraud Control BPG) highlights the 
importance  of  leadership  and  organisational  culture  to  the  success  of  fraud 









50  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra, p. 31. 
51  Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines, Canberra, AGD, 
March 2011, p. III. 
52  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra, p. 1. 
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50  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra, p. 31. 
51  Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines, Canberra, AGD, 
March 2011, p. III. 
52  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra, p. 1. 
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Table 3.1 Traditional vs. contemporary fraud control approaches  
Traditional fraud control Contemporary fraud control 
Fraud risk assessment is a static document 
only updated every two years. 
Fraud risk assessment is a living document 
which is updated through regular, targeted 
risk assessments. 
Fraud control plan is updated and ‘filed’ until 
the next biennial review. 
Ongoing fraud control where the fraud control 
plan is a living document, which is updated in 
lieu of fraud risk assessments. 
Fraud control plan is owned and managed by 
the Fraud Manager. 
Fraud control plan is ‘owned’ by the 
Executive. An entity’s Audit Committee 
provides independent assurance and advice 
to the CEO/Board on the operation of key 
controls and the fraud control plan to the 
extent that it is within its charter. The fraud 
control plan is managed by the Fraud 
Manager and referenced by all levels of 
management.  
Program development and delivery is not 
referenced by the fraud control plan, and 
programs do not consider fraud control at key 
stages in the program life cycle. 
Fraud control plan informs fraud risk 
assessment and fraud control strategies for 
key stages in the program life cycle, 
particularly in program design. 
Fraud awareness training is delivered to new 
staff at induction. 
Fraud awareness training is sponsored by 
the Senior Executive and conducted regularly 
under a risk-based approach. 
Source: ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra.  
3.4 Central  to  the  contemporary  approach  are  four  key  fraud  control 




53  ibid., p. 4. 
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Figure 3.1 Commonwealth fraud control framework 
 




organisation’s  fraud  control  arrangements,  including  that  roles  and 
responsibilities for fraud issues were clearly articulated; 
 regularly assessed and monitored fraud risks; 
 developed  and  implemented  a  comprehensive  and  contemporary 
Fraud Control Plan;  
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Figure 3.1 Commonwealth fraud control framework 
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 developed  and  widely  communicated,  an  informative  fraud  policy 
statement; 







at  the  centre of  an  entity’s  fraud  control  arrangements. The  2011 Guidelines 
emphasised the role of the CEO in building a strong fraud prevention culture 
and  making  fraud  control  strategies  an  integrated  part  of  their  entity’s 
processes and practices.54 The Guidelines also highlighted the need for CEOs to 
satisfy themselves that their entity complied with the mandatory requirements 
of  the  Guidelines;  a  process  generally  relying  on  effective  governance, 
administrative and oversight arrangements. 
3.7 The  importance  of  appropriate  governance  arrangements  and 
leadership oversight are also key themes of the Fraud Control BPG. An entity’s 
executive  leadership  should  ensure business processes,  internal  and  external 
controls are established which reflect the entity’s risk exposure. These should 
be complemented by frameworks which allow for the effective monitoring and 
reporting  of  fraudulent  activities,  and  the  entity’s  response.55  Figure  3.2 
illustrates an example of an effective fraud governance structure.56 
                                                     
54  See Ministerial foreword and paragraph 3.3. 
55  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra, p. 20. 
56  ibid., p. 23. 
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Figure 3.2 Fraud control governance structure 
 
Source: ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra. 




3.9 Austrade  has  implemented  governance  and  internal  administrative 
arrangements intended to address specific risks within the entity. At a whole‐
of‐entity level, the fraud control function is administered by the Fraud Control 
Section  located  in  the Legal, Procurement and Fraud Branch.  In addition,  the 
Export Management Development Grant (EMDG)57 branch had its own specific 
fraud control unit. Austrade advised the ANAO that EDMG had its own fraud 
control  function  due  to  the  high  fraud  risk  associated  with  this  program 
(Figure 3.3). 
                                                     
57  The Export Market Development Grants scheme is an Australian Government financial assistance 
program for aspiring and current exporters. The scheme supports a wide range of industry sectors and 
products, including inbound tourism and the export of intellectual property and know-how outside 
Australia. Austrade, What is EMDG? [Internet], available from 
<http://www.austrade.gov.au/export/export-grants/what-is-emdg>, [accessed 20 March 2014]. 
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Figure 3.2 Fraud control governance structure 
 
Source: ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra. 
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Figure 3.3 Austrade’s fraud control governance and administrative 
arrangements 
 
Source: ANAO summary of Austrade Organisation Chart. 
Notes: A: Until 1 July 2014, Group Manager, Legal, Security and Procurement.  
3.10 Austrade  considers  EMDG  to  be  its major  fraud  risk,  an  assessment 
arising from the nature of the scheme, which involves the payment of grants to 
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3.11 While  the  split of  fraud  control  functions between  the EMDG Branch 
and  the  entity’s Fraud Control  Section  is deliberate,  and  is  intended  to help 
manage specific risks relating to the EMDG scheme, such an arrangement can 
present  challenges  in  developing  and  implementing  an  integrated  fraud 
control strategy across the entity. Austrade advised the ANAO that the fraud 
control  function and  the  reporting of  fraud  is centralised  to  the  role of Chief 
Counsel, Legal, Procurement and Fraud. Nonetheless, Austrade  continues  to 
report  separately,  to  the Audit Committee and CEO, on  the EMDG program 
and  other  entity  fraud  activities.  Further,  the  ANAO’s  interviews  with 
Austrade’s  fraud  control  staff,  indicated  that  the  central  Fraud  Control 
Section—which  is  responsible  for Austrade’s overall  fraud control  strategy—
was often not aware of fraud issues within the EMDG, contributing further to 
the  risk  of  fragmentation  in  fraud  control  arrangements.  There  would  be 
benefit  in  considering  an  approach  involving  more  structured  cross‐
communication between fraud units, to strengthen coordination arrangements.  
3.12 Austrade’s CEO set out the entity’s approach to fraud control through 
the  Chief  Executive’s  Instructions  (CEIs)60,  and  the  Fraud  Control  Plan  is 





review  of  fraud  control  arrangements  will  examine  consistency  with  the 
Guidelines  and  ANAO  Better  Practice  Guide,  and  addressing  the  risk  of 
                                                     
58  Separately, the ANAO is conducting a performance audit of the EMDG program, including its fraud 
control arrangements. The current audit is focussed on Austrade’s entity wide arrangements, and did 
not examine the administration of the EMDG except to the extent of its alignment with Austrade’s 
overarching governance framework for fraud control. 
59  The scope of the current audit does not extend to examining the conduct of internal investigations. 
60  Chief Executive Instructions were a feature of the resource management framework established by the 
FMA Act and Regulations. FMA Regulation 6 made provision for an agency Chief Executive to issue 
Chief Executive Instructions on ‘any matter necessary or convenient for carrying out or giving effect to 
the [FMA] Act or these Regulations…’. 
61  Austrade’s arrangements also provide for the Chief Counsel, Legal, Procurement and Fraud to 
oversee the entity’s handling of instances of fraud following initial investigation. 
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61  Austrade’s arrangements also provide for the Chief Counsel, Legal, Procurement and Fraud to 
oversee the entity’s handling of instances of fraud following initial investigation. 
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3.14 In  2012,  Comcare  commenced  a  restructure  of  its  fraud  control 
governance and operations  to better reflect  the more contemporary approach 
to  fraud management. At  the  time  of  the ANAO’s  fieldwork  for  this  audit, 
Comcare was in the final stages of this restructure (Figure 3.4). 
Figure 3.4 Comcare’s fraud control governance and administrative 
arrangements 
 
Source: Comcare Fraud Control Plan 2013–15. 
3.15 Comcare  advised  the  ANAO  that  its  restructure  was  driven  by  the 
entity’s CEO and senior executives, and aimed  to establish a culture of  fraud 
awareness  at  all  levels  of  the  entity,  with  fraud  control  forming  a  key 
component of Comcare’s governance structure.  
3.16 Under  the revised arrangements, overall coordination of  fraud control 
within Comcare is the responsibility of the Director of Governance, Audit and 
Risk, and  the entity’s Fraud Prevention Officer reports  to  the Director. Fraud 
Operations Teams are located in all of Comcare’s Divisions and are responsible 
for  fraud  prevention;  detection;  investigation  and  monitoring  activities.  The 
Fraud  Prevention  Officer  has  the  role  of  coordinating  and  assisting  Fraud 
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Operations  Teams  in  identifying  fraud  risks  and  implementing  controls. 
Overall,  the new structure  facilitates a coordinated and entity‐wide approach 
to fraud control. 
3.17 While  day‐to‐day  responsibility  for  fraud  control  within  Comcare  is 
delegated  to  the  Director  of  Governance,  Audit  and  Risk,  the  CEO  and 
Executive  continue  to  play  a  key  role.  Comcare’s  Executive  Committee  is 
responsible for endorsing the entity’s Fraud Control Plan, prior to presenting it 




3.18 DVA  commenced  a  significant  restructure  of  its  fraud  control 
governance  and  operational  arrangements  in  August  2013.  During  the 
ANAO’s  fieldwork,  the  restructure  was  still  in  its  initial  stages,  although 
significant  progress  was  being  made  by  DVA  to  reform  its  fraud  control 
operations.  DVA’s  revised  structure  for  fraud  control  is  illustrated  in  
Figure 3.5. 
Figure 3.5  DVA’s fraud control governance and administrative 
arrangements 
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Operations  Teams  in  identifying  fraud  risks  and  implementing  controls. 
Overall,  the new structure  facilitates a coordinated and entity‐wide approach 
to fraud control. 
3.17 While  day‐to‐day  responsibility  for  fraud  control  within  Comcare  is 
delegated  to  the  Director  of  Governance,  Audit  and  Risk,  the  CEO  and 
Executive  continue  to  play  a  key  role.  Comcare’s  Executive  Committee  is 
responsible for endorsing the entity’s Fraud Control Plan, prior to presenting it 
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3.19 Prior  to  commencing  the  restructure  of  fraud  control  arrangements, 
DVA’s  fraud  control  functions were  heavily  focused  on  investigating  fraud, 
with scope for an improved balance between the investigation function and the 
prevention  and  monitoring  functions.  DVA  advised  the  ANAO  that  ‘there 
were  opportunities  to  improve  fraud  control  by working more  closely with 
business  units  to  harness  operational  intelligence’—an  essential  first  step  in 
developing effective  fraud  control  strategies, particularly  in  relation  to  fraud 
prevention.  
3.20 DVA  advised  the ANAO  that  the  restructure  of  its  fraud  operations 
was  driven  by  its  Senior  Executive,  and  Audit  and  Risk  Committee.  The 
restructure  aims  to  incorporate  fraud  control  as  a  key  element  of  DVA’s 
governance structure, with an emphasis on fraud prevention aligned with the 
entity’s key business risks. DVA’s Audit and Risk Committee is responsible for 
endorsing  the  entity’s  Fraud  Control  Plan,  prior  to  presenting  it  to  the 
Secretary  for  final  approval.  The  Compliance  Section  is  required  to  report 
directed  to  the  Secretary,  Deputy  Secretary,  and  other  senior  executives  on 
sensitive fraud related issues as they arise.  
The fraud manager  
3.21 A designated fraud manager provides a clear  line of responsibility for 





Table 3.2 The role of the fraud manager in the selected entities 
Entity Fraud manager Responsibilities 
Austrade Yes The Fraud Control Liaison Officer had dual roles, also 
acting as the entity’s security adviser with a coordinating 
role for the fraud risk assessment and fraud control 
planning activities for most of Austrade’s business units. 
However, due to the high fraud risk associated with the 
EMDG program, Austrade advised that the EMDG 
Division of Austrade undertakes its own fraud control 
administration. 
                                                     
62  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra, pp. 20–21. 
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Entity Fraud manager Responsibilities 
Comcare Yes Director Governance, Audit and Risk had central 
coordination responsibilities for Comcare’s fraud control 
framework.  
DVA Yes The Director Business Compliance Section had a central 
coordination, monitoring, review and promotion role for 
DVA’s fraud control framework. The Officer is located in 
DVA’s Parliamentary and Governance Branch. 
Source: ANAO. 
3.22 Each entity had a designated  fraud manager. The  fraud managers  for 
Comcare  and  DVA  had  overarching  responsibility  for  coordinating  and 
monitoring their entity’s fraud risk. In contrast, Austrade’s arrangements had 
two fraud managers in respect to the EMDG program and Legal, Procurement 
and  Fraud  Division,  reflecting  the  administrative  arrangements  outlined  in 
paragraphs 3.10–3.12 above. As discussed,  the  risk of  fragmentation  in  fraud 
control  arrangements  requires  ongoing  management,  including  through 
appropriate consultative and communication processes between internal fraud 
units and managers. 
The audit committee  
3.23 The role of the audit committee in relation to fraud includes: reviewing 
the entity’s risk management framework to provide assurance that it addresses 
the entity’s business  risks—including  fraud  risks; and providing oversight of 
the development of the entity’s fraud control plan.63 The ANAO examined the 
selected entities’ audit committee charters in respect to fraud control. 
Table 3.3 Audit committee arrangements within entities 
Entity Comments 
Austrade Austrade’s Audit and Risk Committee charter tasks the Committee with 
reviewing whether the entity has in place a framework and process for 
the identification of risk, including fraud. The Committee is also 
responsible for: reviewing the entity’s fraud control arrangements; 
providing assurance that these arrangements are effective in detecting, 
capturing and responding to fraud; and reviewing reports pertaining to 
the level of fraud within the entity, and the status of ongoing fraud 
investigations.  
                                                     
63  ibid., p. 22. 
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Comcare Comcare’s Audit Committee has overarching responsibility for 
reviewing the entity’s risk management framework, and providing 
advice on the entity’s fraud control plan including strategies for the 
detection, capture and response to fraud. 
The Audit Committee is also responsible for: reviewing the level of 
fraud within Comcare; reviewing whether management’s approach to 
dealing with fraud is appropriate and contributes to embedding a 
culture that promotes ethical and lawful behaviour; and providing an 
annual report to the CEO assessing Comcare’s risk and control 
framework. 
DVA The DVA Audit and Risk Committee (ARC) has responsibility for 
reviewing DVA’s risk management and the control and compliance 
framework. To assist in these functions, the ARC established the Risk 
and Integrity Sub-Committee (RISC). The RISC advises the ARC on: 
 DVA’s systems and processes for implementing fraud control and 
the effectiveness of these systems; 
 the effectiveness of the risk management framework; and 
 the steps taken by DVA to embed a culture of ethical and lawful 
behavior. 
Source: ANAO analysis. 
3.24 In summary, each of  the audit committee charters made provision  for 
the committee to review and advise on risk management, including in relation 
to  fraud  control.  In  addition,  the  Austrade,  Comcare  and  DVA  committees 
were  asked  to  provide  regular  reports  to  the  CEO  or  Secretary  on  fraud 
matters. 
Risk management 
3.25 The  identification, assessment and  treatment of risks  is a core element 
of effective fraud control, and can provide a sound basis for the development 
of a fraud control plan and associated strategies and activities to minimise the 
opportunities  for  fraud  to occur.64 A risk‐based approach enables an entity  to 
target its resources, both in prevention and detection, at key problem areas.65  
3.26 An  entity’s  potential  exposure  to  fraud  is  affected  by  the  size  of  the 
entity, and  the nature of  the entity’s business66; as a consequence entities will 
                                                     
64  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra, p. 32. 
65  Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines, Canberra, AGD, 
March 2011, p. 9, paragraph 6.3. 
66  ibid., p. 9, paragraph  6.3. 
  
ANAO Report No.3 2014–15 
Fraud Control Arrangements 
 
64 





whenever  the  entity  undergoes  substantial  change  in  structure  or 
function, as required by the Guidelines; 
 the  process  for  developing  the  fraud  risk  assessment  was  well‐




Fraud risk assessments 
3.28 Table  3.4  summarises  the  key  findings  for  each  entity’s  fraud  risk 
assessment process. 
                                                     
67  ibid., p. 9, paragraph s 6.1 and 6.8. 
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Every two years Low level of response to request 
for fraud risk assessments with 
only two of twelve business units 
responding. 
Risk assessment has limited whole-
of-entity scope. 
No fraud risk assessment 
meetings with responsible 
business areas. 
Fraud risks were not effectively 
identified, evaluated and analysed 
with the responsible business areas. 
Comcare 
Every two years A detailed business process 
mapping document outlined 
processes for undertaking fraud 
risk assessments. 
Clear linkage between fraud risk 
assessments and the broader entity 
risk assessment process. 
Fraud risk assessments were 
developed based on detailed 
business process map and 
methodology. 
Fraud risk assessment clearly 
outlined risk categories, contributing 
factors and detailed risk mitigation 
strategies. 
DVA 
Every two years Fraud risk assessment 
workshops were held with 
business areas, however, a 
restructure occurred shortly 
afterwards, and due to time 
limitations, follow-up risk 
assessment workshops were not 
held. Instead, business areas 
were asked to review and update 
their risks via email. 
Fraud risks were identified through 
the initial workshops, however the 
risks needed to be re-examined more 
thoroughly to assess the impact of 
the restructure. 
Business areas used different 
matrices to assess their degree of 
fraud risk. 
The legend in the fraud risk 
assessment does not allow for 
accurate interpretation of the inherent 
and residual risk ratings.  
Source: ANAO analysis.  
Notes: A: The current fraud risk assessments (as documented in the Fraud Control Plans) for the selected 
entities are: Austrade (2013–15); Comcare (2013–15); and DVA (2012–14). 
3.29 Austrade  and  DVA’s  risk  assessment  processes  limited  the  potential 
effectiveness  of  their  respective  risk  assessments.  Austrade’s  biennial  risk 
assessment process was  conducted on a  two‐yearly basis  consistent with  the 
2011  Guidelines.  As  part  of  that  process,  Austrade  required  its  12  business 
units  to  identify  fraud  risks  and  possible  treatments;  however  only  two 
business  units  contributed.  Austrade  has  advised  that  while  the  initial 
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processes  to  develop  the  draft  plan  were  not  ideal,  senior  management 
intervention led to broader consultation and improvements in the process. It is 
by  creating  a  shared  responsibility  for  fraud  control  amongst  staff  and 
management at all levels that an entity is better placed to embed fraud control 
as part of its governance arrangements and culture. 




3.31 The  whole‐of‐entity  approach  adopted  by  Comcare  produced  an 
integrated  risk  assessment,  which  identified  and  documented  key  risk 
mitigation activities, and clearly assigned accountability for managing risks.  
Fraud Control Plans  
3.32 The  2011  Guidelines  required  that,  following  their  fraud  risk 
assessments,  entities  develop  a  fraud  control  plan  that  addresses  identified 
risks.  Entities  were  also  expected  to  have  in  place  effective  oversight 










Table 3.5 Content of Fraud Control Plans 
 Austrade Comcare DVA 
Mandatory requirements in the Guidelines 
A summary of fraud risks identified Yes Yes Yes 
Outline the key controls in place to address all identified 
high-rated fraud risks. Yes Yes Yes 
Assign ownership for the design, implementation and 
evaluation of identified fraud controls. Yes Yes Yes 
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 Austrade Comcare DVA 
Detail how employees can report and respond to 
suspected fraud. Yes Yes Yes 
Outline how fraud is investigated within the organisation. No Yes Yes 
Include a summary of relevant awareness-raising and 
training strategies. Yes Yes No 
Information about the organisation’s fraud prevention, 
detection, reporting and investigation measures. Yes Yes Yes 
Better practice —Fraud Control BPG 
An outline of the structure of the organisation. Yes Yes Yes 
A statement of the organisation’s attitude, definition and 
approach to fraud. Yes Yes Yes 
Demonstrated links to an up-to-date risk assessment. Yes Yes Yes 
Reinforce the responsibilities that all employees have for 
fraud controls. Yes Yes Yes 
Establish performance indicators and related targets. No No No 
Source: The Guidelines and Fraud Control BPG.  




3.36 Austrade’s  Fraud  Control  Plan  covered  the  period  2013–15,  and 
addressed  the mandatory requirements of  the 2011 Guidelines. The Austrade 
document  continued  to  adopt  a  traditional  approach  focussing primarily  on 
compliance  with  the  mandatory  requirements  of  the  Guidelines,  with 
relatively limited consideration of prevention measures.  
Comcare 
3.37 Comcare  prepared  a  concise  fraud  control  plan  covering  2013–15.  It 




3.38 The DVA  Fraud Control  Plan  covered  the  period  2012–14.  It  largely 
addressed  the mandatory requirements of  the 2011 Guidelines, but  it did not 
include  a  summary  of  awareness  and  training  initiatives.  The  document 
reflected DVA’s  former approach  to  fraud control, with a heavy emphasis on 
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the  entity’s  compliance  framework.  The  document  also  incorporated  the 
Enterprise  Fraud  Risk  Assessment,  and  identified  key  strategic  and  tactical 
risks of the entity.  




transition  from  an  approach  focussing  primarily  on  compliance  and 
investigation,  to  a  more  balanced  approach  of  addressing  prevention, 
deterrence and detection. 
Communicating fraud policies 
Fraud Policy Statements  
3.40 To  foster  an  internal  culture  and  environment  that  encourages  fraud 
prevention and control,  the 2011 Guidelines required entities  to  ‘prepare and 
widely  distribute  a  fraud  policy  statement’.68  The  Fraud Control  BPG  states 
that  a  fraud  policy  statement  is  typically  part  of  other  corporate 






policy  statement.  The  ANAO  examined  whether  the  selected  entities  had  a 
current  fraud  policy  statement,  and  whether  entity  statements  in  the  fraud 
policy  statement  and  other  corporate  documentation  included  the 
recommended elements of the Guidelines (Table 3.6). 
                                                     
68  Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines, Canberra, AGD, 
March 2011, p. 12, paragraph 8.2. 
69  CEIs are discussed in footnote 60. 
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Table 3.6 Content of fraud policy statements and other corporate 
documentation 
Content Austrade Comcare DVA 
Does the entity have a fraud policy statement? YesA YesB Yes 
Definition of fraud  Yes Yes Yes 
Outline of the entity’s position on fraud Yes Yes Yes 
Entities' commitment to investigating and prosecuting 
fraud or pursuing other effective remedies Yes Yes Yes 
A statement of employee and contractor 
responsibilities relating to the prevention and 
reporting of fraud and how fraud is to be reported 
Yes Yes Yes 
What employees and contractors should do if they 
suspect fraud has occurred Yes Yes Yes 
The consequences of acting fraudulently  Yes Yes Yes 
An assurance that allegations and investigations will 
be handled confidentially  Yes Yes Yes 
Directions as to how allegations/incidents of fraud  
are to be managed No Yes Yes 
Advice on where further information can be found Yes Yes Yes 
Source: ANAO analysis.  
Notes: A: Austrade’s fraud policy statement was contained in Chief Executive Instruction No.13.   
B: Comcare’s fraud policy statement was contained in the 2013–15 Fraud Control Plan.  
3.42 Austrade  and  Comcare  developed  and  distributed  a  fraud  policy 
statement which was available  to all employees and contractors.  During  the 
course of this audit DVA also developed a fraud policy statement, and advised 
the ANAO  in June 2014 that  it was available on the DVA  intranet. Where the 
selected entities’ fraud policy statements did not contain all the recommended 
inclusions of  the 2011 Guidelines,  the missing details were  included  in other 
corporate  documents  such  as  the  Fraud  Control  Plan  and  Chief  Executive 
Instructions.  
3.43 While acknowledging that an entity’s broader corporate documentation 
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Promoting fraud awareness  
3.44 In  his  foreword  to  the  2011 Guidelines,  the  then Minister  for  Justice 
observed  that  ‘at  the heart of  the new Guidelines  is an obligation on agency 
CEOs  to build a strong  fraud prevention culture within  their agencies.’70 The 
development of  a  strong  ethical  culture goes hand‐in‐hand with other  fraud 




to  be  conducted  ethically,  displaying  honesty,  integrity,  diligence,  fairness, 
trust, and respect when dealing with others. For  these reasons  it  is advisable 
that agencies, whether FMA Act or CAC Act, put mechanisms in place to assist 
and  train  their  staff  to understand ethical  issues and develop  the  judgement 
and skills needed to deal appropriately with fraud or other misconduct. 71 
3.45 The 2011 Guidelines mandated that:  
…  all  agency  employees  and  contractors must  take  into  account  the need  to 
prevent and detect fraud … 
…  agencies must  implement  a  rolling  program  of  regular  fraud  awareness 
raising and prevention training for all employees … 
… fraud awareness should be included in all induction training programs …72 
Training and information initiatives 
3.46 A  number  of different  approaches  can  be  used  by  entities  to deliver 




70  The Guidelines further emphasised that ‘Fraud control strategies should become an integral part of 
agency culture, processes and practices’ (paragraph 3.3) and that ‘Fraud prevention involves not only 
putting into place effective accounting and operational controls, but also fostering an ethical culture 
that encourages employees and contractors at all levels to play their part in protecting public 
resources’ (paragraph 8.1). 
71  ANAO Report No.42 2009–10, Fraud Control in Australian Government Agencies, March 2011, p. 73. 
72  Emphasis added. The tip-off reporting procedures in each entity are discussed in paragraph 4.5 and 
Table 4.2 of this audit. 
73  For a list of approaches used in the Australian Public Service, see p. 43 of ANAO Better Practice 
Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, Canberra.  
74  ibid., p. 43. 
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Table 3.7 Entities’ approaches to raise awareness of fraud control 
Entity Fraud awareness training offered at each entity 
Austrade  annual general online refresher course; 
 employee induction training; and 
 pre-posting training where required. 
Comcare  annual Fraud Awareness Week; 
 annual E-Learning module on fraud control; 
 internal and external fraud related presentations; 
 fraud awareness training at induction; and 
 fraud related information contained on the internet 
and intranet sites. 
Department of Veterans’ Affairs  investigators speaking at team meetings at the 
request of business areas; 
 Secretary’s messages; 
 DVA news articles; 
 e-learning module; and 
 fraud-related information contained on the intranet 
site. 
Source: ANAO analysis. 
3.48 Austrade included fraud awareness training in the context of a broader 
annual policy refresher for staff, delivered through an online learning module, 
which  all  staff  had  completed  during  2013.  While  a  sound  approach  in 
principle, the online module contained one slide that related only indirectly to 
fraud  control  within  Austrade,  and  was  therefore  an  opportunity  missed. 
Similarly,  Austrade’s  induction  program  for  new  staff  provided  limited 
coverage  on  aspects  of  fraud  control  and  prevention  within  the  entity, 
although  the  topic was  also  referenced  in  the  ‘working  ethically’  and  ‘anti‐
bribery’ modules of the induction program.   
3.49 In addition, Austrade usefully conducted a fraud awareness survey  in 
late  2013, which  resulted  in  three  recommendations  being made  to  improve 
training:  
 review  the  fraud  control  awareness  training  currently  provided  by 
Austrade  to  ensure  sufficient  focus  on  the  nature  of  fraud  and 
corruption relevant to Austrade;  
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 include  an  emphasis  in  training  and  communications  on  the 
importance  of  reporting  suspected  fraud,  even  without  complete 
evidence or where not completely sure if the matter is fraud; and 
 consider conducting a review of training material, guidance and other 
information  available  to  staff  on  fraud  control  with  a  view  to 
consolidating this material and improving usability. 
Austrade fraud awareness survey 
In 2013, Austrade conducted a fraud awareness survey as part of its ongoing strategy 
to monitor employee awareness of fraud control arrangements. The survey aimed to 
identify a range of opinions and awareness levels of fraud activities within Austrade. 
The survey was distributed to all Austrade staff, and had a response rate of 76 per 
cent. 
The survey found that there was a high level of confidence in Austrade’s fraud control 
practices, and a preparedness to report a suspected incident of fraudulent or corrupt 
behaviour. However, the survey also highlighted that only 23 per cent of Austrade staff 
could correctly identify all the presented scenarios of improper practice as fraudulent or 
corrupt behaviour. This highlights the importance of continued education and 
awareness in the overall fraud control framework. The detailed findings of this survey 
are contained in Appendix 5. 
3.50 Austrade advised  the ANAO  that  in  response  to  the  fraud awareness 
survey,  it planned to develop a training package aimed at all staff to  increase 
fraud awareness. Austrade also advised that the training would be delivered to 
both  local and  internationally based staff, and would aim  to address  the key 
issues  identified by  the  survey,  including  the definition of  fraud, Austrade’s 
fraud  control  framework,  and  presenting  a  range  of  fraud  scenarios.  In 
addition, Austrade  indicated that  it conducts anti‐bribery training specifically 
targeted  at  staff  involved  in  areas  of  the  entity  which  engage  with  both 
Australian and  foreign businesses, and as at 20  June 2013, 105 Austrade staff 
had received this training during the 2013 calendar year. 
3.51 Comcare  had  developed  a  comprehensive  and multi‐faceted  strategy 
for  promoting  awareness  of  fraud  control  strategies  within  the  entity.  The 
Comcare  induction program  included a section on fraud awareness, and new 
employees  were  then  required  to  complete  the  mandatory  e‐learning  fraud 
module.  In  addition, Comcare’s  fraud  control plan  indicated  that  the  fraud‐
related content on  the entity’s  internet and  intranet would be updated every 
six months and  that  fraud awareness  forums would be provided  to Comcare 
teams.   
3.52 In  previous  years,  DVA  had  a  largely  ad  hoc  approach  to  fraud 
awareness  training.  While  the  department  had  developed  a  non‐mandatory 
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employees have completed  the course. Further,  the  fraud awareness  training 
was  not  part  of  a  ‘rolling  program’  as  mandated  by  the  Guidelines.  Of 
particular  concern, DVA’s National  Induction Program  for new  staff did not 
refer to fraud or any control measures for fraud prevention. 
3.53 In  the  past  year, DVA  has  sought  to  strengthen  its  fraud  awareness 
program.  It  developed  a  three  year  fraud  awareness  training  framework, 
aimed  at developing,  implementing  and  reviewing  fraud  awareness  training 
including: 
 a new fraud awareness e‐learning module; 
 a  review  of  other  e‐learning  modules  that  could  contain  fraud 






would  improve  and  strengthen  DVA’s  approach  to  raising  internal  fraud 
awareness. 
Training for fraud control employees  
3.55 In addition to providing training to employees as a whole, entities must 
ensure that employees who are primarily engaged in detecting or investigating 
fraud meet  the  required  fraud  control  competency  requirements.75  It  is  also 
better  practice  that  employees  primarily  engaged  in  risk  assessments  and 
planning activities acquire or possess relevant qualifications.76  
3.56 The  ANAO  assessed  whether  relevant  employees  possessed  the 
qualifications  and  credentials  recommended  in  the  2011  Guidelines 
(Table 3.8).77 
                                                     
75  Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines, Canberra, AGD, 
March 2011, paragraph 8.13, p. 7. 
76  ibid., paragraph 8.14, p. 7. 
77  ibid., paragraphs 8.13– 8.14, p. 7. 
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Table 3.8 Qualifications of key fraud control employees 
Entity Qualifications and/or credentials 
Austrade  Certified Practicing Risk Manager; 
 Diploma of Government (Fraud Control Prevention/Detection); 
 Diploma of Government (Fraud Control Investigation); and 
 Certificate IV in Investigative Services. 
Comcare  Diploma of Government (Fraud Control Investigation); and 
 Diploma of Government (Fraud Control Prevention/Detection). 
Department of Veterans’ 
Affairs 
 Certificate IV in Government (Investigations);  
 Diploma in Government (Fraud Control Investigations); 
 All investigative staff are currently undertaking the Certificate 
IV in Government (Fraud Control); and 
 Some staff are enrolled in Certificate IV (Risk Management). 
Source: ANAO analysis. 
3.57 As at December 2013, key  staff  involved  in detecting or  investigating 
fraud allegations  in the selected entities could demonstrate that they held the 
minimum level of qualification.  
3.58 Comcare  and  Austrade  advised  that  key  personnel  in  the  Fraud 
Response Unit had undertaken further training and development to ensure the 
currency  of  their  skills.  This  training  included  attendance  at  relevant 
conferences  and  additional  interviewing,  evidence  gathering  and  case 
management training. DVA advised that profession development for its fraud 
investigators needed  to be more  tailored and  specific  to  their needs, and  the 
department  was  in  the  process  of  developing  and  implementing  a  training 
program to address this.   
Key controls and other risk mitigation measures  
3.59 ANAO  audits  of  financial  statements  involve  an  independent 
examination of the financial accounting and reporting of public sector entities, 
including  for  each  of  the  entities  examined  in  this  audit  report.  ANAO 
financial  statements  audits  examine  the  key  elements  of  internal  control 
including entities’: 
 control environment—to establish whether entities have  implemented 
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 information systems—to establish  the effectiveness of key  information 
technology (IT) controls, including their design and operation; 
 control  activities—to  establish  the  effectiveness  of  the  operation  of 
selected controls and practices designed to prevent fraud, or to mitigate 
against or reduce the risks of fraud, and 
 monitoring  of  controls—to  establish  whether  entities  have 
implemented  effective  quality  assurance  arrangements,  review 
processes and internal audit activities. 
ANAO financial statements audit findings for Austrade, Comcare 
and DVA 
3.60 In the 2012–13 financial statements audits, the ANAO found that there 
were  no  new  significant  or moderate  audit  issues  in Austrade, Comcare,  or 
DVA. However, in DVA, the ANAO reported two moderate issues which were 
ongoing  from  2011–12,  that,  as of  June  2014, had not yet been  resolved  (see 
Table 3.9).78 
Table 3.9 ‘Moderate’ rated issues in DVA 
Heading Description of issue 
Monitoring of user 
access 
The ANAO’s 2011–12 interim audit phase identified a significant number 
of users who continued to have user access that resulted in inadequate 
segregation of duties within key payment systems. In addition, there was 
no monitoring of user access. 
As part of the 2013–14 interim audit phase, the ANAO identified that the 
number of users with these segregation of duties conflicts had been 
reduced to an acceptable level, and their work performed on the systems 
was being logged. However, there was still no monitoring of that work to 
ensure that privileged user access to relevant systems was being used 
appropriately. As a result, there is an increased risk of unauthorised 
actions by privileged users not being identified. 
                                                     
78  ANAO Report No.13 2013–14 Audits of the Financial Statements of Australian Government Entities for 
the Period Ended 30 June 2013, pp. 144, 158 and 197. 
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Heading Description of issue 
Quality assurance 
framework 
During the 2011–12 audit, a number of weaknesses were identified in 
the QA framework relating to the Income Support and Rehabilitation and 
Compensation QA programs. In particular, the audit identified a lack of 
financial quantification of identified errors, inadequate segregation of 
duties within the IT application used for quality assurance, a lack of an 
audit trail for actions completed within this application, inadequate 
documentation of completed procedures, and the existence of errors not 
previously identified by the department. 
As remedial work was in progress at the time of the 2013–14 interim 
audit phase to address these issues, the ANAO will review the status of 
this work as part of its 2013–14 final audit phase. 
Source: ANAO Audit Report No.44 2013–14 Interim Phase of the Audits of the Financial Statements of 
Australian Government Entities for the Period Ended 30 June 2014. 
Conclusion 
3.61 Fraud control within  the Commonwealth public sector has evolved  in 
recent years, with a move away from the more traditional approach focused on 
compliance,  detection  and  investigation  towards  a  more  contemporary 
approach  which  treats  fraud  control  and  prevention  as  core  elements  of 
corporate governance. The shift in orientation was strongly promoted through 
the 2011 Guidelines and was also  reflected  in  the Fraud Control BPG. A key 
feature of  the contemporary approach  is prevention, with well‐designed and 
implemented  strategies  to  prevent  fraud  considered  the  most  cost‐effective 
approach to managing fraud risks.  
3.62 Comcare approached fraud control as a key governance function. This 
approach  was  reflected  in  its  adoption  of  an  internal  fraud  prevention 
framework  which  included  a  fit‐for‐purpose  and  integrated  fraud  risk 






3.63 DVA’s  and  Austrade’s  approach  to  fraud  control  was  in  transition 
during  the  course  of  the  audit.  DVA  had  historically  focused  largely  on 
compliance, with a heavy emphasis on investigating fraud after it had occurred 
rather  than prevention. The department  commenced a  significant  restructure 
of its fraud control operations and governance in August 2013, rebalancing its 
approach  to  include more prevention  and deterrence  strategies  alongside  its 
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existing  detection  strategies,  in  line  with  the  more  contemporary  approach. 
However, DVA’s approach  to date  in communicating  its revised expectations 
and  raising  fraud  awareness  among  staff,  has  not  been  fully  effective.  The 
relevant education online module was out of date and had not been promoted 
to  staff;  however,  at  the  time  of  the  audit,  DVA  had  already  commenced 
developing a new training framework to address this.  
3.64 Austrade  has  made  more  limited  changes  to  its  entity‐wide  fraud 
control  arrangements  since  the  introduction  of  the  2011  Guidelines,  and 
aspects  of  Austrade’s  internal  management  arrangements  relating  to  fraud 
control have created a  risk of  fragmentation.  In addition  to a whole‐of‐entity 
fraud unit located in its Corporate Services Group, Austrade has established a 
dedicated fraud team within its Export Market Development Grants program, 




the  reporting  of  fraud  is  centralised  to  the  role  of  a  senior  executive. 
Nonetheless, Austrade continues to report separately, to the Audit Committee 
and CEO, on the EMDG program and other entity activities,  and there would 
be  benefit  in  considering  an  approach  involving  more  structured  cross‐
communication between fraud units to strengthen coordination arrangements. 
In the course of the audit, Austrade advised the ANAO that an internal review 
of  fraud  control  arrangements will  examine  consistency with  the Guidelines 
and ANAO Better Practice Guide, and the risk of fragmentation between fraud 
management arrangements for EMDG and other parts of Austrade.   
3.65 Austrade’s biennial  risk assessment process was conducted on a  two‐
yearly  basis  consistent  with  the  2011  Guidelines.  As  part  of  that  process, 
Austrade  required  its  12  business  units  to  identify  fraud  risks  and  possible 
treatments;  however,  only  two  business  units  contributed.  Austrade  has 
advised  that  while  the  initial  processes  to  develop  the  draft  plan  were  not 
ideal,  senior  management  intervention  led  to  broader  consultation  and 
improvements in the process. It is by creating a shared responsibility for fraud 
control  amongst  staff  and  management  at  all  levels  that  an  entity  is  better 
placed  to  embed  fraud  control  as  part  of  its  governance  arrangements  and 
culture.  
3.66 Limitations  were  also  identified  in  Austrade’s  approach  to  fraud 
awareness training, with only one question on fraud appearing in the context 
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indicated  that  less  than  one  in  four  staff  could  correctly  identify  all  the 
potentially fraudulent or corrupt behaviours canvassed. 
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4. Detecting and Responding to Fraud 
This  chapter  examines  whether  the  selected  entities  have  effective  systems  and 
processes in place designed to detect and respond to instances of fraud. 
Introduction 
4.1 All  Australian  government  entities  were  susceptible  to  fraud,  and  a 
system  of  preventive  measures  will  not  provide  absolute  assurance  that  a 
fraudulent event will be avoided.79 Detection activities are designed to identify 
fraud  that  is  occurring,  or  has  occurred.  They  are  different  to  prevention 
activities  and  control,  which  are  designed  to  reduce  the  risk  of  fraud  from 
occurring.80 
4.2 Fraud detection,  investigation and  response were key elements of  the 
2011  Commonwealth  Fraud  Control  Guidelines  (the  2011  Guidelines).81  The 
Guidelines  stated  that Australian government entities must have appropriate 
systems in place to ensure they are able to detect internal or external fraud, or 
attempted  fraud.82 As part of  a  risk‐based  approach,  entities  are  expected  to 
implement  appropriate  measures  aimed  at  detecting  and  managing  fraud, 
informed by their particular risks.  
Detection measures 
4.3 The  ANAO  Better  Practice  Guide,  Fraud  Control  in  Australian 
Government Entities  (Fraud Control BPG), describes  fraud detection measures 
as being either passive or active.83 Passive detection measures include the day‐
to‐day  controls  or  activities  in  place  to  protect  the  integrity,  accuracy  and 
completeness  of  business  decisions  and  financial  transactions.  Active  fraud 
detection  measures  are  those  that  require  the  assertive  involvement  of  the 
                                                     
79  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra, p. 53. 
80  ANAO Report No.42 2009–10 Fraud Control in Australian Government Agencies, p. 87. 
81  This audit examined detection and response, up to the point when an investigation is initiated. It did 
not examine the investigative process undertaken by the audited agencies, or by external agencies 
such as the Australian Federal Police.   
82  Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines, March 2011, p. 15, 
paragraph 10.2. 
83  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra, p. 51. 
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and  are  generally  more  reliant  on  examining  databases  and  employing 
statistical analysis than are passive detection methods (Table 4.1).  
Table 4.1 Examples of passive and active detection measures 
Passive Active 
Fraud allegation reporting mechanisms Monitoring and reviewing activities 
Internal controls Data matching 
Whistleblowing and public interest 
disclosures 
Data mining—post payment monitoring 
 Internal audit 
Source: ANAO summary from Fraud Control in Australian Government Agencies, March 2011, pp. 51–60. 
4.4 The  selected mix  of detection measures  should be  appropriate  to  the 
entity’s risk profile and business functions.  
Passive detection measures 
4.5 The  ANAO  examined  a  selection  of  the  passive  detection  measures 
adopted  by  the  selected  entities  (Table  4.2).  The  entities’  fraud  allegation 
reporting mechanisms and whistleblowing arrangements are discussed  in  the 
paragraphs below, while IT controls were discussed in paragraphs 3.59–3.60. 
Table 4.2 Passive detection measures used by selected entities 
 Austrade Comcare DVA 
Fraud allegation reporting mechanisms 
 tip-off facility for members of the public Yes Yes Yes 
 tip-off facility for employees and contractors  Yes Yes Yes 








 employees and contractors are advised of the tip-
off process Yes Yes Yes 
Internal Controls 
 quality assurance reviews Yes Yes Yes 
 managerial review of work processes Yes Yes Yes 
                                                     
84  ibid., p. 51. 
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 Austrade Comcare DVA 
Whistleblowing/Public Interest Disclosures(PID)A 
 employees are made aware of protection given to 
whistleblowers/PID Yes Yes Yes 
 employees are made aware how to make a 
whistleblowing/PID disclosure  Yes Yes Yes 
Source: ANAO analysis based on the requirements and better practice suggestions from the 
Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines and the Fraud Control BPG.   
Notes: A: The Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 replaced the APS Whistleblowing scheme on 
15 January 2014. 
Fraud allegation reporting mechanisms 
4.6 Australian  government  entities  must  provide  employees,  clients  and 
members of  the public with  an  appropriate  channel  for  reporting  fraud.85  In 
each of  the  selected entities,  there were pathways  for  staff,  service providers 
and  members  of  the  public  to  access  tip‐off  facilities,  and  entities  had 




4.7 Within  Austrade,  tip‐offs  not  related  to  Export  Management 
Development Grants  (EMDGs)  are made  to  the  relevant  manager  and/or  the 
Chief Counsel Legal, Procurement and Fraud. In the case of EMDG, tip‐offs are 




discussed  in  Chapter  3,  further  fragmented  internal  fraud  control 
arrangements—introducing  a  risk  of  inconsistent  handling  and  processing  of 
tip‐offs,  and  a  situation where  fraud  risks were  not  necessarily monitored  or 
communicated within Austrade. 
4.8 The  2011  Guidelines  also  highlighted  the  benefit  of  mechanisms  to 
enable public reporting of fraud, and recommended that:  
                                                     
85  Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines, March 2011, p. 15, 
paragraph 10.4. 
86  The number of tip-offs are reported each year by the agencies to the Australian Institute of 
Criminology, for inclusion in the annual Fraud against the Commonwealth report.  
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putting  in  place  mechanisms  to  enable  members  of  the  public  to  report 
suspected fraudulent activity by an agency’s clients, employees, contractors or 
agents.87 
4.9 Comcare  and  Austrade  facilitated  public  reporting  on  fraud  by 
maintaining a dedicated webpage for this purpose.88,89,90 This facility was more 




Whistleblowing and Public Interest Disclosures 
4.10 While employees and members of  the public must have  the ability  to 
provide  tip‐offs,  it  is  also  good  practice  that  Australian  Public  Service 
employees are aware of  the protection available  for whistleblowers or Public 
Interest  Disclosures.94  While  not  required  by  the  2011  Guidelines,  Austrade 
and DVA provided  information about whistleblowing  in  their Fraud Control 
Plans  and  all  the  entities  had  whistleblowing  policies  available  on  their 




87  Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines, March 2011, p. 15, 
paragraph 10.3. 
88  Comcare ‘Reporting Fraud’, 20 March 2014, available from 
<https://www.comcare.gov.au/the_scheme/fraud/reporting_fraud> [accessed 30 March 2014].  
89  The fraud reporting facility on Austrade’s website is located within the Export Market Development 
Grants scheme webpage.  
90  Austrade, EMDG Fraud Hotline, 2014, available from <http://www.austrade.gov.au/Export/Export-
Grants/Contact-us/Fraud-hotline/EMDG-Fraud-Hotline> [accessed 7 April 2014]. 
91  Department of Veterans’ Affairs, Chapter 11–Your Rights , 7 February 2014, available from 
<http://www.dva.gov.au/pensions_and_compensation/yandyp/Pages/Ch11.aspx> [accessed 30 March 
2014].  
92  Department of Veterans’ Affairs, Contact DVA, 7 February 2014, available from 
<http://www.dva.gov.au/contact_us/Pages/index.aspx> [accessed 30 March 2014]. 
93  Austrade, Contact Austrade, 2014, available from <http://www.austrade.gov.au/About-
Austrade/Contact-us> [accessed 7 April 2014]. 
94  Whistleblowing referred to the reporting, in the public interest, of information which alleged a breach of 
the Australian Public Service Code of Conduct (including fraud) by an employee. ANAO Better 
Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Agencies, March 2011, p. 56. The Public 
Interest Disclosure Act 2013  introduced, from 15 January 2014, a scheme to encourage public 
officials to report suspected wrongdoing in the Australian public sector. 
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risk  jobs or  areas,  conducting  reviews or  internal  audits,  intrusion detection 
systems,  review  activity  focussed on  clients at  risk or data mining  and data 
matching.95  
4.12 The  Fraud Control BPG describes  such measures  as  ‘active detection 
mechanisms’.96  The  ANAO  examined  a  selection  of  the  active  detection 
mechanisms used by the three entities (Table 4.3).   
Table 4.3 Active detection measures used by selected entities 
 Austrade Comcare DVA 
Statistical analysis of payments and processes 
 post-payment monitoring No Yes Yes 
 data mining  No Yes Yes 
 trend analysis Yes Yes Yes 
 data matching N/AA YesA Yes 
Monitoring and review of activities to detect internal fraud 
 monitoring of users with high risk access to 
internal IT systems Yes Yes Yes
B 
 restricted access to client files Yes Yes Yes 
 restricted access to fraud investigation files Yes Yes Yes 
Internal audit (IA) 
 IA examines entity fraud control processes Yes Yes Yes 
 IA designs their work program to include 
audits on fraud Yes Yes Yes 
 IA reports fraud risks and relevant findings to 
the Fraud Control section of the entity Yes Yes Yes 
Source: ANAO analysis based on the requirements and better practice suggestions from the Guidelines 
and the Fraud Control BPG. 
                                                     
95  Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines, March 2011, p. 15, 
paragraph 10.2. 
96  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra, pp. 53, 56–60. 
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87  Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines, March 2011, p. 15, 
paragraph 10.3. 
88  Comcare ‘Reporting Fraud’, 20 March 2014, available from 
<https://www.comcare.gov.au/the_scheme/fraud/reporting_fraud> [accessed 30 March 2014].  
89  The fraud reporting facility on Austrade’s website is located within the Export Market Development 
Grants scheme webpage.  
90  Austrade, EMDG Fraud Hotline, 2014, available from <http://www.austrade.gov.au/Export/Export-
Grants/Contact-us/Fraud-hotline/EMDG-Fraud-Hotline> [accessed 7 April 2014]. 
91  Department of Veterans’ Affairs, Chapter 11–Your Rights , 7 February 2014, available from 
<http://www.dva.gov.au/pensions_and_compensation/yandyp/Pages/Ch11.aspx> [accessed 30 March 
2014].  
92  Department of Veterans’ Affairs, Contact DVA, 7 February 2014, available from 
<http://www.dva.gov.au/contact_us/Pages/index.aspx> [accessed 30 March 2014]. 
93  Austrade, Contact Austrade, 2014, available from <http://www.austrade.gov.au/About-
Austrade/Contact-us> [accessed 7 April 2014]. 
94  Whistleblowing referred to the reporting, in the public interest, of information which alleged a breach of 
the Australian Public Service Code of Conduct (including fraud) by an employee. ANAO Better 
Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Agencies, March 2011, p. 56. The Public 
Interest Disclosure Act 2013  introduced, from 15 January 2014, a scheme to encourage public 
officials to report suspected wrongdoing in the Australian public sector. 
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Notes: A: Austrade and Comcare are not defined as a ‘participating assistance agency that holds 
personal data’ by the Data-matching Program Act 1990. Therefore they are not required to perform 
data matching. However, Comcare undertakes data matching as part of its fraud detection 
measures.  
B: DVA maintains and monitors staff access to multiple IT systems that present a high fraud risk. 
For example, this could include a user that can access both the system to create a new client and 
the system to commence payments to the new client. The segregation of duties within key 
payment systems is an important IT control and was discussed further in Table 3.9. 
Statistical analysis of payments and processes 
4.13 Each  of  the  entities  implemented  active  detection  mechanisms. 
Comcare  and DVA  shared  similar business  risks—both were  responsible  for 
payments to individuals and service providers where certain criteria are met—
and  therefore performed a variety of statistical analysis  tasks as part of  their 
day‐to‐day  business.  For DVA,  analysis  results  are provided  to  the  relevant 
business  areas  in  an  easily  interpreted  format,  and  both  the  fraud  control 
section  and  the  relevant  business  areas  meet  to  assess  and  act  on  issues 
identified by the analysis.  
4.14 Austrade was mainly responsible for administering grants to business, 
and  operating  a  network  of  overseas  representatives.  In  2013,  Austrade 
engaged its internal auditor to undertake a data analytics project covering key 
operational  data  including  expenditure,  financial  transactions  and  cost  of 
overseas  residential  property. Austrade  advised  the ANAO  that  it  used  the 
findings of this analysis to inform its offshore programs, and develop its future 
review programs.  
4.15 Comcare and DVA are  responsible  for  the  regular payment of public 
money  to  individuals  and  service  providers,  and  therefore  operate  in  an 
environment  of  higher  risk  exposure  to  fraud  than  most  Commonwealth 
entities. Both entities have implemented post‐payment monitoring activities to 
detect possible fraud, involving the analysis of data relating to payments made 
to  service  providers97,  to  detect  unusual  payments.  This  could  include 
payments which  appear higher  than normal  for  a particular  service, or high 
volumes of smaller payments to the same service provider. 
Data matching 
4.16 As  a  ‘listed participating  assistance  agency  that holds personal data’, 
the   Data‐matching Program Act 1990 requires DVA to perform data matching, 
                                                     
97  Service providers at DVA and Comcare include, but are not limited to: medical, hospital and transport 
services. 
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4.15 Comcare and DVA are  responsible  for  the  regular payment of public 
money  to  individuals  and  service  providers,  and  therefore  operate  in  an 
environment  of  higher  risk  exposure  to  fraud  than  most  Commonwealth 
entities. Both entities have implemented post‐payment monitoring activities to 
detect possible fraud, involving the analysis of data relating to payments made 
to  service  providers97,  to  detect  unusual  payments.  This  could  include 
payments which  appear higher  than normal  for  a particular  service, or high 
volumes of smaller payments to the same service provider. 
Data matching 
4.16 As  a  ‘listed participating  assistance  agency  that holds personal data’, 
the   Data‐matching Program Act 1990 requires DVA to perform data matching, 
                                                     
97  Service providers at DVA and Comcare include, but are not limited to: medical, hospital and transport 
services. 
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and  report  annually  to  the Parliament on  any  activity  carried out under  the 
Datamatching  Program  (Assistance  and  Tax)  Act  1990  (the  Data  Matching 
Program Act). Data matching98  is  the process of comparing  large data sets of 




 instances where people are receiving  incorrect or dual payments  from 
one or more assistance agencies (payment matching); 
 instances where the  income declared to the Australian Taxation Office 
(ATO)  varies  from  the  income  disclosed  to  the  assistance  agencies 
(income matching); and 
 instances of tax evasion. 










4.19 While  Comcare  is  not  required  to  perform  data  matching  activities 





98  In the 1990–91 budget, the then Government announced new measures to detect incorrect payments 
in the income support system. This involved a program of computer matching of identity and income 
data held by a limited number of government agencies, including the Australian Taxation Office. 
People claiming Australian Government financial assistance have to provide a Tax File Number as a 
condition of receiving a pension or allowance. 
99  Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Annual Report 2012–13, p. 80.  
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4.20 Entity  records  indicate  that  the  use  of  data  matching  by  DVA  and 
Comcare  has  identified  potential  cases  of  fraud.  Table  4.4  identifies  the 
documented outcomes of data matching activities in Comcare and DVA. 
Table 4.4 Outcomes of data matching in Comcare and DVA 
 
Comcare DVA 
2010–11 2011–12 2010–11 2011–12 
Total number of records read 4 279 3 553 1 155 698 1 462 236 
Total number of discrepancies 328 297 18 135 17 129 
Proportion of matches that resulted in 
discrepancies 7.7% 8.4% 1.6% 1.2% 
Number of discrepancies referred for 
investigation N/A N/A 750 1 223 
Net savings produced as a result of 
action from data matchingA N/A N/A $1 632 333 $1 026 337 
Net cumulative savingsB N/A N/AC $21 691 265 $22 717 602 
Source: ANAO analysis of Comcare and DVA data matching reports. Rounding errors are present in the 
percentages given for ‘proportion of matches that resulted in discrepancies’  
Notes: A: Total of gross savings (from corrected payments), minus departmental expenses. 
 B: A rolling total, since the commencement of the data matching program. 








4.22 The  selected  entities  had  internal  audit  units  that  were  tasked  to 
contribute  to  the  entity‐wide  fraud  control  effort,  as  expected  in  the 
2011 Guidelines.  The  ANAO  found  that  fraud  comprised  a  key  element  of 
Austrade’s  internal  audit  program,  and  Austrade  had  conducted  numerous 
audits since the introduction of the Guidelines focussing on fraud. The findings 
of  these  audits  were  presented  to  the  Audit  and  Risk  Committee  through 
Austrade’s Quarterly Risk Report. 
                                                     
100  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra, p. 59. 
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100  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra, p. 59. 
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4.23 Comcare advised  the ANAO  that  its Audit Committee reviewed draft 
internal  audit  reports  and,  if  approved,  the  report was  considered  the  final 
version. After  each meeting, Comcare’s Audit Committee  also  provided  the 
CEO with reports, which included comments on internal audit reports and the 
status of outstanding audit findings. 
Responding to allegations of fraud 
4.24 Fraud  investigators  should  be  appropriately  trained  and  conduct 
investigations  in  accordance  with  the  Australian  Government  Investigative 
Standards  2011  (AGIS).101,102  While  the  investigative  practices  of  the  selected 
entities were not examined in this audit, the ANAO considered the availability 
and content of guidance and tools available to fraud investigators. 
4.25 A  number  of  the  key  tools  for  supporting  fraud  investigations  are 
summarised in Table 4.5 and discussed in the paragraphs below.  
Table 4.5 Key tools for supporting a fraud investigation 
The entities have... Austrade Comcare DVA 
recorded allegations in an appropriately secure 
fraud incident register, file and/or electronic case 
management system 
YesA Yes Yes 
appropriately trained persons responsible for 
making the initial assessmentB Yes Yes Yes 
documented investigation procedures NoC Yes YesD 
a case prioritisation model N/AE Yes Yes 
Source: ANAO analysis, based on the Australian Government Investigative Standards 2011 and ANAO 
Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, Canberra. 
Notes: A: See also Table 4.6. 
B: See also Table 3.8 
C: Austrade advised that the EMDG program has an investigation manual and case prioritisation 
model. 
D: DVA has an investigation manual, which was being updated during the audit. This is the first 
update since the Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines were released in March 2011. 
E: Austrade advised that, except for the EMDG program, it does not have a fraud case-load that 
would warrant the implementation of a case prioritisation model.   
                                                     
101  ibid., p. 65. 
102  The Australian Government Investigative Standards (AGIS) were developed for Australian 
Government entities to ensure quality investigative practices and outcomes. All Australian Government 
agencies required to comply with the Fraud Control Guidelines, must also comply with the minimum 
standards for investigations set out in AGIS. Australian Federal Police, Investigation Standards 
[Internet], <http://www.afp.gov.au/policing/fraud/investigation-standards.aspx>  
[accessed 28 February 2014]. 
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Documented investigation procedures and case prioritisation models 
4.26 The  2011  Guidelines  stated  that  entities  must  have  appropriately 
documented procedures, setting out  the criteria  for making decisions during a 
fraud investigation.103 The processes and procedures must be consistent with, or 
exceed,  the  model  procedures  outlined  in  the  AGIS.104  A  case  prioritisation 
model also aids the decision‐maker in making the initial assessment, and helps 
drive transparency and consistency in decision‐making.105 
4.27 Austrade  does  not  have  an  investigation  manual,  except  for 
investigations conducted by the EMDG fraud investigations team. It provides 
managers  with  guidance  in  the  form  of  brief  policy  and  procedure  papers 
titled  ‘Dealing with Misconduct—Code of Conduct breaches’. While a source 
of advice in respect to internal misconduct, the papers do not address external 
fraud.  Further,  Austrade’s  policy  and  procedures  papers  do  not  provide 
guidance  to  fraud  investigators  on  how  to  conduct  an  investigation,  as 
required by the Guidelines.106 
4.28 Comcare has developed documented investigation procedures to guide 










103  Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines, March 2011, p. 15, 
paragraphs 10.6–10.7. 
104  ibid., p. 17, paragraph 10.24. 
105  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra, p. 66. 
106  Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines, March 2011, p. 17, 
paragraph 10.24. 
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103  Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines, March 2011, p. 15, 
paragraphs 10.6–10.7. 
104  ibid., p. 17, paragraph 10.24. 
105  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra, p. 66. 
106  Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines, March 2011, p. 17, 
paragraph 10.24. 
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4.30 DVA has a  fraud  investigation manual and advised  the ANAO  that  it 
was  in  the process of updating  the manual as part of  its reform process. The 
manual was  last updated  in May  2010, before  the Fraud Control Guidelines 
were released in March 2011, and had not been a source of up‐to‐date advice in 
recent years. 
4.31 DVA  has  also  taken  a  risk‐based  approach  to  its  fraud  investigation 
procedures,  by  implementing  a  Case  Prioritisation  Model  to  identify  high 
priority  cases  for  the  department  to  investigate.  Prior  to  this,  DVA  was 
investigating  every  allegation  of  fraud  in  the  order  that  allegations  were 
reported. This was not necessarily the most efficient or risk‐based approach, as 
allegations made to DVA are generally found to relate to non‐compliant, rather 
than  fraudulent,  behaviour.  The  department’s  case  prioritisation  model  has 
been  in  operation  since  February  2014,  and  has  recently  undergone  some 
minor alterations to the thresholds used to prioritise potential fraud cases. 
4.32 The ANAO’s Fraud Control BPG sets out a decision tree tool intended 
to  provide  guidance  on  the  process  for  fraud  investigations  and  responses. 
Entities can encourage fraud investigators to follow a standardised process by 
establishing a similar tool as a guide to better understand the critical decisions 
that  need  to  be  made  and  documented,  from  the  initial  assessment  of  the 
allegation and throughout the fraud investigation and response process. Fraud 
operations  at Austrade, Comcare  and DVA were mapped  out  in  a  decision 
tree, for the guidance of investigators.  




use.  The  2011  Guidelines  added  that  entities  must  have  systems  in  place  to 
manage  information  gathered  about  fraud  against  the  entity,  as  this  would 
                                                     
107  Comcare and DVA based their Case Prioritisation Models on two years of operational intelligence from 
their fraud divisions. Using this information, the agencies were able to statistically determine the 
markers that identify cases that are statistically likely to yield an outcome for the Government—or 
should be investigated as a priority. These markers could include the type of fraud alleged (that is, 
‘false information’ or ‘deceased claimant’; previous allegations of fraud; and the overall sensitivity of 
the allegation). 
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Fraud Control BPG discusses  the  benefit  of  implementing  a  formal  reporting 
system, where all instances or allegations of internal or external fraud, and any 
subsequent  investigations  and  outcomes,  can  be  securely  stored,  recorded, 
analysed and monitored.109 
Fraud incident registers 
4.34 A  reporting  system  that  records  all  allegations  of  fraud,  and  any 
subsequent  investigation  actions  and  their  outcomes,  can  provide  a  valuable 
overview of the nature, extent and location of fraud within an entity. It can also: 
form  the  basis  for  developing  an  intelligence  capability;  provide  the  data 
necessary for reporting and the identification of trends; and provide a deterrent 
effect  which  will  assist  an  entity  in  minimising  the  impact  of  fraud  on  its 
operations.110,111 
4.35 The  Fraud Control BPG details  a  list  of  inclusions  in  a  fraud  incident 
register,  as  recommended  in  the  Australian  Standard  AS  8001‐2008  Fraud  and 




108  Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines, March 2011, p. 15, 
paragraphs 12.1–12.2.  
109  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra, p. 65–66. 
110  ibid., p. 73. 
111  Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines, March 2011, p. 21, 
paragraph 12.1. 
112  ibid., p. 65. 
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108  Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines, March 2011, p. 15, 
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109  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra, p. 65–66. 
110  ibid., p. 73. 
111  Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines, March 2011, p. 21, 
paragraph 12.1. 
112  ibid., p. 65. 
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Table 4.6 Information recommended for inclusion in a fraud incident 
register 
 Austrade Comcare DVA 
Date and time of report NoA Yes Yes 
Date and time of incident detection NoA Yes Yes 
How the incident was reported (anonymous report, 
line management, etc) No Yes Yes 
Nature of the incident Yes Yes Yes 
Value of the loss to the entity (if any) No Yes Yes 
Action taken following detection Yes Yes Yes 
Source: ANAO analysis.  
Note:  A: While Austrade records the date of the report and incident detection, it does not record the time 
of the report and incident detection. Austrade’s central fraud incident register also does not contain 
any records of EMDG fraud incidents. 
4.36 Comcare  and  DVA  had  fraud  incident  management  registers 
containing  all  the  fields  recommended  for  inclusion  in  the  Australian 
Standard,  while  Austrade’s  register  contained  only  limited  information  and 
did  not  include EMDG  fraud  incidents;  further, Austrade’s  register was  not 
entirely  consistent  with  the  suggestions  for  better  practice  made  in  the 
Australia Standard, which are referenced in the AGIS and Fraud Control BPG.  
Responding to identified fraud 
4.37 After  an  investigation  is  completed,  an  entity must decide  if  there  is 
sufficient  evidence  to  justify  further  legal  action.  A  case  for  fraud  can  be 
handled at a civil  level  (between  the entity and  the defendant) or  the matter 
can be referred to the Australian Federal Police or Commonwealth Director of 
Public Prosecutions (CDPP). Prosecutions and civil litigation are one means of 
deterring  future  fraud,  and  in  educating  the public  about  the  seriousness of 
fraud.113  If  it  is  determined  that  there  is  not  sufficient  evidence  for  a 
prosecution or civil litigation, entities may consider alternative options, such as 
administrative  action,  the  recovery  of  losses,  education  activities  and/or  a 
reconsideration of internal controls. 
                                                     
113  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra, p. 69. 
  
ANAO Report No.3 2014–15 
Fraud Control Arrangements 
 
92 
4.38 The ANAO examined  the selected entities’ responses  to allegations of 
fraud or non‐compliance and  found  that  the majority of allegations are dealt 
with internally, or not pursued further (Table 4.7).114 
Table 4.7  Responses to fraud allegations in 2012–13 
 Austrade Comcare DVA 
New fraud allegations/reviews 27 147 252 
Allegations resulting in detection of fraud 12 43 9A 
Matters referred to the law enforcement agencies 
and the CDPP 1 5 4 
Convictions 0 N/AB 1 
Source: ANAO analysis of entities’ Annual Reports and their submissions to the AIC for 2012–13.  
Notes: A: In 2012–13, DVA started reporting non-compliance and fraud separately. 
B: These cases were ongoing during the audit. 
Conclusion 
4.39 Fraud prevention strategies can help reduce, but not entirely eliminate, 
an  entityʹs  fraud  risk.  Effective  fraud  detection  and  response  measures  are 
necessary  to  provide  assurance  that  perpetrators  of  fraudulent  acts  are 
identified, and appropriate action is taken.  
4.40 Broadly  speaking,  fraud  detection methods  can  be  passive  or  active. 
The  ANAO  examined  the  selected  entitiesʹ  implementation  of  the  passive 




processed  by  individual  business units. Reflecting Austradeʹs  administrative 
arrangements discussed  above, Austradeʹs  central  fraud  control unit did not 
always  have  visibility  of  the  review processes  adopted  by  business units  or 
responses to fraud across the entity. This approach further fragmented internal 
fraud  control  arrangements;  introducing  a  risk  of  inconsistent  handling  and 
processing of  tip‐offs, and a situation where  fraud  risks were not necessarily 
monitored or communicated within Austrade.  
                                                     
114  An entity will only proceed to:  
 criminal prosecution, if there is a reasonable prospect of a criminal conviction being secured (ie: 
evidence beyond reasonable doubt), or  
 civil litigation, if there is sufficient evidence on the balance of probabilities.  
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4.41 Each  of  the  selected  entities  employed  a  range  of  active  detection 
methods;  with  the  specific  measures  adopted  by  entities  reflecting  their 
differing business operations. The  two payment entities, Comcare and DVA, 
regularly undertook  a wide  variety  of  statistical  analysis  aimed  at detecting 




4.42 DVA  is  required,  by  the Data‐matching  Program Act  1990,  to  perform 
data matching analysis. Comcare has also added data matching to its range of 
active  detection  measures,  although  it  is  not  mandated.  The  use  of  data 
matching by DVA and Comcare has identified potential cases of fraud.  
4.43 Consistent  with  the  2011  Guidelines,  Comcare  and  DVA  maintained 
fraud  incident  registers which were used  to  inform  their CEO of  the  level of 
fraud within  the  entity  and  to prepare  external  reporting  to AGD. Austrade 




investigation  manual,  standardised  assessment  templates  and  a  case 
prioritisation  model  to  assess  and  prioritise  fraud  allegations.  DVA  had  an  
out‐of‐date  investigation  manual  and  the  department  advised  it  was  in  the 
process of updating  the manual. DVA had  implemented a case prioritisation 
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5. Monitoring and Reviewing Fraud 
Control Arrangements 
This  chapter  examines  whether  the  selected  entities  have  effective  processes  for 
monitoring and reviewing their fraud control arrangements. 
Introduction 
5.1 Effective  monitoring  and  review  can  provide  assurance  that  fraud 
control  arrangements  are  operating  as  intended  and  can  also  promote 
accountability  and  fraud  awareness  within  entities.  In  addition,  after  any 
incidence of fraud, an entity should investigate the situation which allowed the 
fraud  to  occur,  to  determine  the  cause  and  establish  recommendations  for 
change in future activities.115  














115  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra,  p. 76, paragraph 8.1.3. 
116  See ANAO Report No.42 2009–10 Fraud Control in Australian Government Agencies, pp. 15–16. The 
report concluded that while there had been an improvement in the level of compliance with the Fraud 
Control Guidelines between 2002 and 2009, a key area for improvement was the evaluation of specific 
fraud control strategies. See also, ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian 
Government Entities, March 2011, Canberra, p. 75. 
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change in future activities.115  
5.2 More  specifically,  regular  monitoring  and  review  of  fraud  control 
strategies can inform an entity’s assessment of the: 












115  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra,  p. 76, paragraph 8.1.3. 
116  See ANAO Report No.42 2009–10 Fraud Control in Australian Government Agencies, pp. 15–16. The 
report concluded that while there had been an improvement in the level of compliance with the Fraud 
Control Guidelines between 2002 and 2009, a key area for improvement was the evaluation of specific 
fraud control strategies. See also, ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian 
Government Entities, March 2011, Canberra, p. 75. 
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5.4 In  the  current  audit,  the  ANAO  examined  the  selected  entities’ 
procedures  and  frequency  for  assessing  the  effectiveness  of  their  respective 
fraud  control  arrangements  against  the  requirements  of  the  2011 Guidelines 
and the suggestions for better practice in the ANAO’s Fraud Control BPG. 
Monitoring and review 
5.5 The  2011 Guidelines  contained  a number of mandatory  requirements 




 fraud  risk  assessments  must  be  followed  by  the  development  (or 
updating) and  implementation of a  fraud  control plan  to manage  the 
risks118; and 
 where an entity undergoes a substantial change  in structure,  function, 
or  where  there  is  a  significant  transfer  in  function…the  entity  must 
undertake  another  fraud  risk  assessment  in  relation  to  the  changed 
functions.119 
5.6 The  selected  entities’  processes  to  monitor  and  review  their  fraud 
control arrangements, as mandated by the 2011 Guidelines, are summarised in 
(Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1 Selected entities’ processes to monitor and review their 
fraud control arrangements—2011 Fraud Control Guidelines 
Entities have processes in place to monitor and 
review the: 
Austrade Comcare DVA 
Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines (mandatory) requirements on: 
risk assessments  Yes Yes Yes 
fraud control plan Yes Yes Yes 
reassessing fraud control after major 
restructure Yes Yes Yes 
Source: ANAO analysis. 
                                                     
117  Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines, March 2011, p. 9, 
paragraph 6.1. 
118  ibid., p. 11, paragraph 7.1. 
119  ibid., p. 9, paragraph 6.8. 
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Review of risk assessments and fraud control plans 
5.7 Each  of  the  selected  entities  has  established  processes  to  review  its 
fraud risk assessment every two years, and to subsequently review and update 
its fraud control plan.  
5.8 In  addition  to  the  two‐yearly  review  of  the  fraud  risk  assessment, 
entities should establish processes to continuously monitor the risks identified 
in  the  risk  assessment,  to  assist  in  the  effective  selection  of  risk  treatments. 
Consistent with  this approach,  the selected entities had established processes 
for  the  continuous  review of  their  risk assessments, and  risk  treatments. For 
example120:  
 DVA  identified  15 moderate  risks  in  its  2012–14 Fraud Control Plans 





of  its  annual  business  planning  cycle.  Comcare  also  re‐assesses  its 
investigative  priorities  biannually,  to  address  emerging  issues  and 
opportunities; and 
 Austrade advised  the ANAO  that  it was  reviewing  its Fraud Control 
Plan,  using  the  ‘better  practice’  checklist  questions  from  the  Fraud 
Control BPG.121     
Review of fraud control arrangements after a major restructure 
5.9 Austrade, Comcare  and DVA  advised  that  they  reviewed  their  fraud 
control  arrangements  when  they  had  undergone  significant  internal 
restructuring.  For  example,  as  part  of  the  September  2013  machinery‐of‐
government  changes,  the  Tourism  Division  of  the  former  Department  of 
Resources,  Energy  and  Tourism was  transferred  to Austrade.  The Austrade 
Fraud Liaison Officer met with the Tourism Division representatives to discuss 
the  integration  of  the  fraud  risk  assessments  and  Fraud  Control  Plans. 
                                                     
120  These are examples of some methods used by the selected entities to monitor and review their fraud 
control arrangements. As such, they are not intended to be an all-inclusive list of the relevant activities 
used by each entity. 
121  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra, pp. 24, 50, 60, 72, 79. 
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121  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra, pp. 24, 50, 60, 72, 79. 
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Austrade’s  Fraud  Control  Plan  and  Enterprise  Risk  Assessments  were 
subsequently  reviewed  and  updated.  Austrade  advised  the  ANAO  that  the 
revised  Fraud  Control  Plan  was  scheduled  to  be  approved  by  the  CEO  by 
October 2014.    
Application of better practice  
5.10 The Fraud Control BPG sets out additional suggestions to support the 




Table 5.2 Entities’ implementation of better practice in monitoring 
and reviewing 
Entities have processes in place to monitor and 
review the: 
Austrade Comcare DVA 
situation which allowed fraud to occur Yes Yes Yes 
methods to measure the loss of fraud  Yes Yes Yes 
Source: ANAO analysis, based on ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government 
Entities, March 2011, Canberra. 
Review the situation that allowed fraud to occur 
5.11 Reviewing work processes after potential fraud  is  identified allows an 
entity to determine whether its processes are effective in addressing its current 
and  emerging  fraud  risks.  The  Fraud  Control  BPG  gives  two  examples  of 
fraud‐related incidents, and possible responses (Table 5.3). 
Table 5.3  Review and possible responses to an incident of fraud 
Incident Response 
A one-off action by a person in a 
position of privilege. 
Any new person in this position may be subjected to 
additional or periodical screening or monitoring. 
The inadequacy of internal controls. Controls should be re-evaluated and any deficiencies remedied. 
Source:  ANAO summary of paragraph 8.1.3 in the ANAO Fraud Control BPG. 
5.12 Quarterly  risk  reports  are  provided  to  Austrade’s  Audit  and  Risk 
Committee to monitor fraud or non‐compliance. Progress on fraud investigations 
are progressively  reported  to  the Committee on  the detail of  the  fraud, current 
actions  taken and  final outcome. These reports are also provided  to Austrade’s 
CEO  and Executive. At  the  completion  of  a  fraud  investigation,  processes  are 
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reviewed by  the  internal auditor  to provide assurance on controls and prevent 
recurrence of the fraud. 
5.13 Comcare  and  DVA  both  have  processes  in  place  to  review  work 
processes after fraud is detected. Comcare’s Fraud Operations team consists of 




5.14 DVA’s  Business  Compliance  Section  has,  in  part,  a  similar  role  to 
Comcare’s Fraud Detection Officer. DVA advised the ANAO that as part of its 
redevelopment of fraud operations, a major focus has been on identifying the 
controls  and  business  processes  that  need  strengthening,  to  prevent 
opportunities  for  fraudulent  and  non‐compliant  behaviour  to  occur.  For 
example,  in  June  2011,  DVA’s  analysis  of  the  claiming  patterns  of  Exercise 
Physiologists  (EPs)  identified  a  rapid  increase  in  the  expenditure  for  this 
service since the  introduction of rebates  in 2008123 and the need to  implement 
additional  controls  to  manage  risk.124  DVA’s  response  included  introducing 
policy  controls  around  the  delivery  of  this  service,  providing  education  to 
service providers, updating guidance to all EPs, and creating a DVA position 
to advise EPs and implement the changes. 
Methods to measure loss from fraud 
5.15 Methods to measure losses due to fraudulent activity are closely linked 
to  active  fraud  detection  methods  (see  discussion  in  Chapter  4).  Using 
statistical  analysis,  fraud  events  can be  analysed  to  identify  the key  controls 
that  need  to  be  reviewed  to  address  identified  deficiencies.  This  type  of 
analysis  can  also  enable  the  entity  to  perform  a  cost‐benefit  analysis  of  the 
control  framework and remediation activity, and monitor  the effectiveness of 
its  fraud  control  activities.125  For  example,  in  its  2012–13  Annual  Report, 
Comcare reported that: 
                                                     
122  Comcare, Comcare Fraud Control Plan 2013–15, August 2013, p. 9. 
123  The expenditure had increased three-fold, to up to $7 million per year, despite a minimal increase in 
the numbers of practitioners. 
124  Identified fraudulent and/or non-compliant activities included over-servicing, double claims, incorrect 
facts of advertising, excessive treatments on the same day and item code issues. DVA minute, June 
2011. 
125  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra, p. 77, paragraph 8.1.4. 
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reviewed by  the  internal auditor  to provide assurance on controls and prevent 
recurrence of the fraud. 
5.13 Comcare  and  DVA  both  have  processes  in  place  to  review  work 
processes after fraud is detected. Comcare’s Fraud Operations team consists of 
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125  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra, p. 77, paragraph 8.1.4. 
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controls,  and  whether  they  can  be  strengthened.  Austrade  reports  on  the 
estimated  value  of  fraud  at  the  time  it  is  identified.  The Guidelines  do  not 
mandate a specific method for entities to measure and report fraud losses, so it 





the  Fraud Control  BPG. Austrade  also  undertakes  active  detection  activities 
including its data analytics program.127 The results of this program are used to 
focus internal audit activity on areas which represent a relatively higher risk of 





aware of  the outcomes of  the  fraud control activities undertaken.’128,129 Under 
the  2011  Guidelines,  entities  were  required  to  report  externally  on  fraud 
control  arrangements  and  to  certify  adherence  with  the  Guidelines  to  their 
Minister,  the  Minister  for  Justice,  and  to  the  Australian  Institute  of 
Criminology  (AIC).130,131  The  requirement  for  regular  external  reporting 
                                                     
126  Comcare, Comcare Annual Report 2012–13, Canberra, October 2013, p. 97.  
127  See paragraph 4.14. 
128  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra, p. 77, paragraph 8.2. 
129  These stakeholders include the Portfolio Minister and responsible Minister, the Attorney-General, the 
Parliament, clients and the general public. ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian 
Government Agencies, March 2011, p. 73.  
130  Australian Government agencies commenced annual reporting on fraud in 1995–96, and from  
2002–03 to 2006–07, the annual Fraud Against the Commonwealth Report was released by the 
Attorney-General’s Department. In 2006–07 this responsibility was transferred to the AIC. 
131  The AIC conducts an annual survey of fraud control arrangements to inform its preparations of the 
annual Fraud Against the Commonwealth Report, see paragraphs 2.22–2.27. 
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underlines  the  importance  of  fraud  control  activity  within  entities  and  is 
intended to reinforce entity responsibilities in this respect.  
5.19 The ANAO  examined  the  selected  entities’ practices  for  reporting  on 
the occurrence of fraud against them.  
Reporting internally 
5.20 While  the  2011  Guidelines  did  not  set  out  internal  reporting 
requirements, effective  internal reporting  is generally a necessary  first step  in 
complying  with  external  reporting  requirements.  Further,  effective  internal 
reporting  arrangements  facilitate  the  management  of  fraud  risks  within  an 
entity.132,133  
Selected entities’ reporting to their Audit Committee 
5.21 Audit  committees  can play  a valuable  role  in providing  independent 
assurance and advice  to  the CEO on  the outcomes of  fraud control activities, 
including: monitoring; review and evaluation; and follow‐up action (including 
investigations  underway  and/or  the  outcomes  of  prosecutions  or  civil 
action).134 The ANAO examined  the  selected entities’  reporting  to  their audit 
committees on fraud control arrangements (Table 5.4).135 
Table 5.4 Entity reporting to their audit committee 
In 2013, did the entity’s audit committee receive 
reports regarding any: 
Austrade Comcare DVA 
monitoring and evaluation activities  Yes Yes Yes 
investigations outcomes  Yes Yes Yes 
prosecution or civil action outcomes Yes Yes Yes 
Source: ANAO analysis.  
                                                     
132  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra, p. 77. 
133  The Fraud Control BPG indicates that the central point of contact for all fraud-related matters, which 
includes establishing and managing internal reporting channels, should be the Fraud Manager. This 
role is discussed in paragraphs 3.21–3.22 of this audit. See ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud 
Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, Canberra, p. 77, paragraphs 3.4 and 8.2.1. 
134  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra, p. 77, paragraph 8.2.1. 
135  The majority of internal reporting is conducted by the agency’s fraud control section when briefing the 
audit committee. The role of audit committees in each of the audited agencies is discussed in 
paragraph 3.23 of this audit.  
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reported  quarterly  to  their  audit  and  risk  committees  on  the  three  matters 
suggested in the Fraud Control BPG. 




5.24 As  discussed,  while  Austrade  has  established  internal  reporting 
processes  to  the  senior  executive  and  audit  committee  through  the  Chief 





5.25 Comcare  advised  the  ANAO  that  the  Director  responsible  for  fraud 
prevention provides monthly  reports  to  the Executive  through  the Corporate 
Operations Division Report. In addition, the Fraud Response Unit reports to a 
variety of internal committees and forums. 
5.26 DVA  advised  the  ANAO  that  when  fraudulent  or  non‐compliant 
activity  is  identified,  the  Business  Compliance  Section  will  meet  with  the 
relevant  business  areas  to  discuss  the  incident,  and  encourage  the  business 
areas  to  review  relevant  controls  and/or  business  processes  to  decrease  the 
likelihood  of  similar  fraudulent  activity  in  the  future.  DVA’s  Business 
Compliance Section also releases  ‘traffic  light’ reports  to all business areas  to 
highlight  areas  of  unusual  claiming  patterns,  as  identified  by  Post  Payment 
Monitoring processes. 
Reporting externally 





136  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra, p. 77. 
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 their  entity  has  prepared  fraud  risk  assessments  and  fraud 
control plans; 
 their entity has in place appropriate fraud prevention, detection, 
investigation,  reporting  and  data  collection  procedures  and 
processes that meet the specific needs of the entity; and 




by  30  September  each  year.  Agencies  are  required  to  provide  the 
information by responding to an online survey hosted by the AIC.138 
5.29 The  ANAO  examined  whether  the  selected  entities  met  the  external 
reporting requirements (Table 5.5). 
                                                     
137  ANAO Better Practice Guide—Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities, March 2011, 
Canberra, p. 78. 
138  Attorney-General’s Department, Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines, March 2011, pp. 8 and 21, 
paragraphs 5.8 and 12.4. 
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Table 5.5 Entities’ compliance with external reporting requirements 
In 2012–13, did the entities: Austrade Comcare A DVA 
Annual Report 
1. report to their minister on fraud risk and fraud 
control measures Partial Partial Partial 
2. certify compliance with the GuidelinesB  Yes Yes PartialC  
AIC Survey response 
3. complete the AIC fraud survey Yes Yes Yes 
Source: ANAO analysis of requirements in the 2011 Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines.  
Notes: A: As a CAC Act agency, Comcare was not required to meet these reporting requirements, but had 
‘fully committed’ to complying with the Guidelines ‘in order to minimise the incidence of fraud’ and 
certified compliance in its 2012–13 Annual Report. 
B: This requirement was also included in the ‘Requirements for Annual Reports for Departments, 
Executive Agencies and FMA Act Bodies’ prepared by the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, and approved by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit.  
C: In respect to the second mandatory reporting requirement, DVA did not certify the third sub-
requirement— that ‘they had taken all reasonable measures to minimise the incidence of fraud in 
their agency and to investigate and recover the proceeds of the fraud’ in their Annual Report. 
5.30 In summary, the ANAO found that: 
 for  the  first  mandatory  external  reporting  requirement,  the  selected 
entities complied with three of the four sub‐requirements; 
 the  selected  agencies  reported  on  fraud  initiatives  in  their 










139  ibid., p. 8, paragraph 5.8  
140  DVA advised the ANAO that processes have now been implemented to ensure that all necessary 
certifications are included in future Annual Reports. 
141  See paragraph 2.26 of this audit. 
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5.31 In  the  context  of  an  evolving  business  and  operating  environment, 
entities can help manage their risks by employing a flexible rolling program of 
reviews, audits and evaluations, and by actively  looking  for opportunities  to 
improve fraud control arrangements.  
5.32 The selected entities  reviewed  their  risk assessments every  two years, 
and  their  Fraud  Control  Plans  were  updated  following  those  exercises. 
Comcare and DVA also had established processes to review poorly performing 





committees  (and  through  the  audit  committee  to  the  CEO)  were  generally 
aligned,  in  terms  of  process  and  content,  to  the  2011 Guidelines  and  better 
practice discussed in the ANAOʹs Fraud Control BPG. However, Austrade did 
not  adopt  a  centralised  recording  system,  and  its  individual  fraud  units 
reported  separately  to  its  audit  committee  and  executive,  albeit  through  a 
nominated senior officer. Further, Austrade’s audit committee received limited 
information on the outcome of investigations, prosecutions and civil actions. 
5.34 External  reporting  promotes  accountability,  informs  government  and 
stakeholders  of  developments,  and  facilitates  whole‐of‐government 
monitoring  and  responses  to  fraud  risks.  The  selected  entities  generally 
complied  with  the  external  reporting  requirements  in  the  2011  Guidelines, 
reported  internally and externally on  fraud  risk and  fraud  control measures, 
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Appendix 1: Entities’ responses 
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Appendix 3: AGD Response—Implementation of 
Recommendations from ANAO Report 
No.42 2009–10 
Consult with the AIC and consider approaches that will allow the AIC to collect, analyse and 
disseminate fraud trend data on a more consistent basis 
The Department has: 
 conducted regular meetings with the AIC on the fraud survey and AIC Fraud Against the 
Commonwealth Report. This has increased AIC’s understanding of the needs of the 
Department and outcomes sought from the survey and report, which has in turn led to 
improvements to the Commonwealth fraud control survey and how the AIC analyses collected 
data. 
 incorporated the AIC into the fraud control network run by the Department. This has facilitated 
direct contact between agencies and the AIC, and allowed the AIC to improve awareness of 
agencies on the data that the survey is intended to capture. 
 continued to review contents of survey questions to accurately capture non-compliance and 
fraud. 
 worked with the AIC and agencies to modify the annual fraud control survey to collect better 
quality data. This is an ongoing process. 
Continue to work with the Department of Finance and Deregulation to clarify which CAC Act bodies 
are subject to the Guidelines 
Following this recommendation the Department began a process to issue a General Policy Order 
(GPO) to bind CAC Act entities. The Department worked with the Department of Finance and 
Deregulation to consult all CAC Act entities and draft a GPO. This process was suspended in 2012 
due to the development of the PGPA Act. 
The Department is working with the Department of Finance to identify an approach under the new 
PGPA Act regime to provide a consistent and coherent risk based approach to fraud control that will 
apply to a broader set of Commonwealth entities, including CAC Act (now corporate) entities. 
Consider the merits of establishing an approach for the provision of fraud control advice and 
information to Australian Government agencies, particularly to smaller sized agencies, that 
facilitates the provision and exchange of practical fraud control advice 
The Department has: 
 developed online resources (via Govspace and Govdex) to facilitate broader access to fraud 
control information. These websites have improved access to, and sharing of, fraud control 
information across the Commonwealth. 
 conducted a series of seminars/workshops on fraud control issues. These events have raised 
key fraud control issues with Commonwealth agencies and facilitated networking between fraud 
control officers. 
 held annual Fraud Liaison Forums, to provide a vehicle to identify key fraud issues across the 
Commonwealth, share information with agencies and facilitate networking of fraud officers. 
 maintained a general email enquiry inbox, which provides a central contact point for agencies. 
 assisted agencies in their reviews of fraud control plans and risk assessments. 
 briefed agency audit committees and boards on request. 
Source: ANAO reproduction of response from the AGD response paper, 14.01.2014 by the 
Attorney-General’s Department. 
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Table A.1: Implementation of ANAO’s recommendationA by the 
Attorney-General’s Department 
Sub-recommendation Met/not met Comments 
Consult with the AIC and 
consider approaches that will 
allow the AIC to collect, analyse 
and disseminate fraud trend 
data on a more consistent basis 
Partly met AGD advised that it had consulted with AIC 
which has led to improvements in the fraud 
control survey and the analysis of fraud 
data. However, as no report has been 
produced in the last three years, the 
recommendation has not been fully 
implemented, and the intended outcome 
has not been achieved.  
Continue to work with the 
Department of Finance and 
Deregulation to clarify which 
Commonwealth Authorities and 
Companies Act 1997 bodies 
are subject to the Guidelines 
Partly met AGD advised it commenced this process in 
response to the previous audit, however, 
this process was suspended in 2012 due to 
the development of the PGPA Act.  
Consider the merits of 
establishing an approach for 
the provision of fraud control 
advice and information to 
Australian Government 
agencies, particularly to smaller 
sized agencies, that facilitates 
the provision and exchange of 
practical fraud control advice 
Met Steps taken by AGD to provide advice on 
fraud control across the Commonwealth 
include the development of the Govdex 
and Govspace websites; the fraud control 
forums and seminars; and workshops 
provided to agencies on fraud. 
Source:  ANAO analysis. 
Note: A: Recommendation No.1, ANAO Audit Report No.42 2009–10 Fraud Control in Australian 
Government Agencies. 
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Appendix 4: Draft Commonwealth Fraud Control 
Guidelines Compliance Report, 2010–11 
and 2011–12 
Key findings 
1. FMA  Act  agencies  report  high  levels  of  compliance  with  the  key 
requirements of the Guidelines over both the 2010–2011 and 2011–2012 
reporting periods.   
2. A  large  number  of  CAC  Act  entities  report  compliance  with  the 
Guidelines, despite there being no requirement for them to do so. 
3. Most FMA Act agencies (94 per cent) reported meeting the requirement 
to provide  the Australian  Institute of Criminology  (AIC) with data on 
fraud incidents and compliance with the Guidelines. 
4. The vast majority of agencies (96 per cent in 2010‐11 and 97 per cent in 
2011–12) undertook  fraud risk assessments within  the  two years prior 
to  the  reporting  periods  and  maintaining  up‐to‐date  fraud  control 
plans, with  the majority  (97 per cent) developing a new  fraud control 
plan following the introduction of revised Guidelines in 2011. 
5. A  small minority  of  agencies  reported CEO  certification  of  adequate 
fraud  arrangements  within  the  entity,  while  also  self‐reporting 
non‐compliance  with  the  key  requirement  to  undertake  a  fraud  risk 
assessment at least every two years. 
6. For  2011–12,  most  agencies  which  were  non‐compliant  with  risk 
assessment or  control plan  requirements were  either new agencies or 
agencies which were previously CAC Act entities.    
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Guidelines Compliance Report, 2010–11 
and 2011–12 
Key findings 
1. FMA  Act  agencies  report  high  levels  of  compliance  with  the  key 
requirements of the Guidelines over both the 2010–2011 and 2011–2012 
reporting periods.   
2. A  large  number  of  CAC  Act  entities  report  compliance  with  the 
Guidelines, despite there being no requirement for them to do so. 
3. Most FMA Act agencies (94 per cent) reported meeting the requirement 
to provide  the Australian  Institute of Criminology  (AIC) with data on 
fraud incidents and compliance with the Guidelines. 
4. The vast majority of agencies (96 per cent in 2010‐11 and 97 per cent in 
2011–12) undertook  fraud risk assessments within  the  two years prior 
to  the  reporting  periods  and  maintaining  up‐to‐date  fraud  control 
plans, with  the majority  (97 per cent) developing a new  fraud control 
plan following the introduction of revised Guidelines in 2011. 
5. A  small minority  of  agencies  reported CEO  certification  of  adequate 
fraud  arrangements  within  the  entity,  while  also  self‐reporting 
non‐compliance  with  the  key  requirement  to  undertake  a  fraud  risk 
assessment at least every two years. 
6. For  2011–12,  most  agencies  which  were  non‐compliant  with  risk 
assessment or  control plan  requirements were  either new agencies or 
agencies which were previously CAC Act entities.    
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Table A.2: Number of FMA Act agencies where CEO certified adequate 
fraud arrangements in place 
 2010–11 2011–12 
CEO certified 94 92 
CEO did not certify 0 3 
Question not answered 0 2 
Source: ANAO reproduction of data in the AGD 2010–11 and 2011–12 Compliance Report. 
Table A.3: Year last risk assessment was conducted by FMA Act 
agencies 
 2010–11 2011–12 
Current year 67 73 
In last two years 23 21 
Over two years ago 3 1 
Never 0 2 
Question not answered 1 0 
Source: ANAO reproduction of data in the AGD 2010–11 and 2011–12 Compliance Report. 
Table A.4: FMA Act agencies with up-to-date Fraud Control Plans 
 2010–11 2011–12 
Current year 60 73 
In last two years 31 22 
Over two years ago 2 1 
Never had one 0 1 
Question not answered 1 0 
‘Before last risk assessment’ 1 1A 
Source: ANAO reproduction of data in the AGD 2010–11 and 2011–12 Compliance Report.  
Notes: A: The data in this table reflects the data presented by AGD in the source document. The ANAO 
notes that there are errors in this data. 
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I am confident in Austrade’s fraud control practices to...: 
 Effectively minimise  
 Effectively investigate 
 Appropriately prosecute 
 Rapidly detect 







Austrade is more focussed on fraud risk management now, compared to 
two years ago. 89% 
The risk of fraud has either reduced or not worsened over the previous 
12 months. 98% 
I recognise my obligation to report fraudulent or corrupt conduct. 99% 
I know how to report an incident of fraudulent or corrupt conduct. 93% 
My report of fraudulent or corrupt conduct will be treated confidentially. 89% 
Reported incidents of fraudulent or corrupt conduct will be thoroughly 
investigated. 87% 
If confronted with an incident of fraudulent or corrupt conduct, I would be 
prepared to report the incident, even without evidence. 70% 
I have been exposed to some form of training about fraud risk 
management. 95% 
The survey also presented five scenarios of improper practice. Only 23 per cent of Austrade 
staff were able to correctly identify all five as fraudulent or corrupt. These scenarios were: 
A staff member used Austrade funds to make a payment of $100 directly to a low-level 
government official to speed up a routine government application. 
A job applicant falsely claimed to have a post-graduate degree. 
A staff member took money from petty cash. When the missing money was discovered, the 
staff member involved said that they were only borrowing the money and they were planning 
to return it on pay day. 
A staff member provides additional information, following release of a tender, to one of the 
tenderers because they believe that tenderer is best placed to undertake the project. 
A staff member using Austrade assets for personal colour printing to the value of $250 in one 
year. 
Source: ANAO summary of Austrade 2013 Fraud Control Awareness Survey. 
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Better Practice Guides 
The following Better Practice Guides are available on the ANAO website: 
Successful Implementation of Policy Initiatives  Oct. 2014 
Public Sector Governance: Strengthening Performance through Good 
Governance 
June 2014 
Administering Regulation: Achieving the Right Balance  June 2014 
Implementing Better Practice Grants Administration  Dec. 2013 
Human Resource Management Information Systems: Risks and controls  June 2013 
Preparation of Financial Statements by Public Sector Entities  June 2013 
Public Sector Internal Audit: An investment in assurance and business 
improvement 
Sept. 2012 
Public Sector Environmental Management: Reducing the environmental 
impacts of public sector operations 
Apr. 2012 
Developing and Managing Contracts: Getting the right outcome, 
achieving value for money 
Feb. 2012 
Public Sector Audit Committees: Independent assurance and advice for 
chief executives and boards 
Aug. 2011 
Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities  Mar. 2011 
Strategic and Operational Management of Assets by Public Sector 
Entities: Delivering agreed outcomes through an efficient and 
optimal asset base 
Sept. 2010 
Planning and Approving Projects – an Executive Perspective: Setting 
the foundation for results 
June 2010 
Innovation in the Public Sector: Enabling better performance, driving 
new directions 
Dec. 2009 
SAP ECC 6.0: Security and control  June 2009 
Business Continuity Management: Building resilience in public sector 
entities 
June 2009 
Developing and Managing Internal Budgets  June 2008 
 
 
